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ARTICLES
RESTRAINTS ON INCUMBENT DIRECTORS IN
INTRACORPORATE BATTLES FOR CONTROL
Dr. Aaron Yoran*
[Editor's Note: The first portion of Dr. Yoran's article, dealing with
directors' maneuvering power in closed corporations, appeared in the
Winter issue of the Review.]
PNoxy BATtLES
The modem proxy contest has become a grotesque travesty of an or-
derly machinery for corporate decision making.
-Prof. B. Manning in 67 Yale L. 1. 1478 (1958)
A. Insurgents' Access to ShareholdersA S in a contest for power in a closed corporation, incumbent direc-
tors of public corporations may attempt to frustrate their un-
seating in a proxy battle by diluting the voting power of the insurgent,
or by disturbing the exercise of his voting power.5 Whenever a proxy
battle is waged, 0 neither the incumbent nor insurgent group has suffi-
cient shares to insure legal control, and success therefore depends on
persuading uncommitted shareholders to side with one group and grant
it proxies.57 An indispensable condition for the solicitation of proxies is
a complete and up-to-date list of shareholders.58 Management, of course,
* Lecturer in Law, Hebrew University; LL.B., Hebrew University, 1966; LL.M., Colum-
bia University, 1968; S.J.D., Harvard University, 1971.
55 Management also has in its arsenal a variety of tactics which can make its perform-
ance look better or fend off the takeover threat. It suffices to say that there exists a
clear tendency for the restraining rules espoused for private companies to be eased
where publicly held companies are concerned. See the English "duo", Hogg v. Cramp-
horn, Ltd. [1967] Ch. 254 and Bamford v. Bamford [1970] Ch. 212, and the Delaware
"trio", Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del.
1962); Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960).
56 The term "proxy" will be used indiscriminately hereinafter for both the form of
authorization and the agent.
57 See generally the revolutionary article of Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy
Machinery, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1489 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Eisenberg].
58 Inspection of the shareholders list is also significant to a takeover bidder. A prospec-
tive bidder, however, may forgo the list at least until he makes the offer public, or acts
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has the corporate records at its disposal; the insurgent, however, can
obtain such a list only if the corporate records are open to inspection,
or if management has a duty to furnish such a list. Similarly, the right of
accesss to the corporate books and records is of crucial importance, be-
cause by inspecting the books and records, the insurgent may gather
important information for his campaign. Indeed, concrete proof of man-
agement failures gleaned from these sources could mean victory for
the insurgent.
1. England
In England, Sections 110-15 of the Companies Act require that every
company keep a register of members open for inspection by every mem-
ber without charge,5 9 and by outsiders on payment of a token fee.6 ,
If a company has more than fifty members, it must also keep an index
accompanying the register.0' Furthermore, every member and any out-
sider can obtain a copy of the register on payment of a fixed copying
fee.62 Compliance with this disclosure duty is safeguarded by criminal
penalties for defaulting companies and their officers,63 and by judicial
power to compel immediate compliance."
The only "loophole" in the English scheme is that there is no statutory
requirement that the register be kept current.65 Furthermore, a com-
pany may close the register of members "for any time or times not ex-
ceeding in the whole thirty days in each year." 06 However, before
closing, a company must give public notice in a local newspaper of the
through a straw man, in order to surprise the incumbents. A derivative plaintiff might
also seek a list in order to muster a sufficient front of plaintiffs to be free from deposit
of security statutes. Cf. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). A
derivative plaintiff might also seek inspection of the corporate books and records to
substantiate his case.
59 Companies Act, 1967, c. 81, §§ 110-15.
60ld. at §§ 110, 113. The maximum charge for an outsider is a shilling. Id. at § 113 (1).
61 Id. at§ 111.
62 Id. at § 113 (2). The fee is two shillings maximum per one hundred words. See
Yoran, Insider Trading in Israel and England, 7 IsRAEL L. RE,. 215, at 219, n.11. (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Insider Trading].
6 3 Companies Act, 1967, c. 81, §§ 110 (4), 111 (4), 113 (3).
64 Id. at § 113 (4). If the company employs an outside register agent, the latter is put
in a position of an officer regarding both penalties for noncompliance and the court's
power to order compliance. Id. at § 114.
6 5 Hornstein, Comparative Company Law; New Perspectives, 5 Isa. L. REv. 799 (1970)
66 Companies Act, 1967, c. 81, § 115.
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registered office's district.67 Apparently, the Act does not insure timely
notice to potential insurgents, nor does it state the length of time be-
tween the notice and the closing. Moreover, the principal office of a
company may be situated in a location different from its registered
office. Insurgents might not see the notice published in the district of the
registered office, and would consequently overlook it. The registers for
directors 8 and controlling shareholders, 9 also open to inspection,"" are
designed to prevent the employment of nominees or the use of bearer
shares from causing the members' register not to reflect the true owner-
ship. Hence, insofar as directors and controlling shareholders comply
with their reporting duties, management will not have knowledge
superior to that of insurgents about the distribution of voting power in
the company.71
English law72 also provides insurgents with another device for bringing
their campaign to the individual shareholder. Holders of at least five
percent of the voting power, or not less than 100 shareholders on whose
shares at least 10,000 pounds has been paid up, have a right to demand
that the corporation give notice to shareholders of a resolution that the
five percent holders seek to present at the upcoming annual general
meeting. The five percent holders can also demand that the corporation
circulate to the voting shareholders a statement of not more than one
thousand words, prepared by the five percent holders, advocating the
adoption of the proposed resolution. 73 Legal writers agree that this de-
vice is useless:74 the notice and circular are sent at the insurgents' ex-.
pense,76 and the directors can refuse the insurgents' demands upon
671d.
68 Id. at §§ 27, 29. See Insider Trading, supra rfote 62, at 246.
69 Companies Act, 1967, § 33, 34. See Insider Trading, supra note 62, at 246.
70 Companies Act, 1967, §§ 29 (7), 29 (10), 34 (5), 34 (7).
71 Management is always alerted to transfers of blocks of shares. It might trace nominee-
held shares to the true owners, or it might discover the owners of bearer shares by the
latter's appearance (or giving proxy) in an earlier meeting. Hence, management will
have an advantage over insurgents if controlling shareholders do not comply with the
reporting duties.
72 Companies Act, 1948, § 140.
73 They can also urge shareholders to vote against management's proposals.
14 GowEn, supra note 18, at 483-84; R. NNImGTON, CoMPANY LAw 522 (2d ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as PENmaroN]; R. PENmNGTomr , Tim INvEsToR AND m LAw 428-29
(1968).
15 The company, however, may resolve otherwise. See note 77 infra. The only saving
to insurgents when they use the corporate machinery occurs when the circular is sent
out together with the corporate notices.
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obtaining a court decision that the insurgents have abused their rights"to secure needless publicity for defamatory matters." 7 6 Circulating the
material by the insurgents themselves according to an available list of
shareholders, without being limited to a thousand words, has proven
an effective way to conduct the campaign.7
The right to have management circulate the insurgents' material is
limited to annual general meetings. However, another important right
of the insurgents is to have extraordinary general meetings called.78
This right is possessed by shareholders holding not less than ten per-
cent of the paid-up voting shares. If the directors do not proceed duly 9
to convene a meeting within 21 days from the date of the request to do
so, the insurgents may convene the meeting themselves and charge the
expenses, to be borne ultimately by the directors,8 0 to the corporation.
This right enables insurgents to wage a proxy fight as they deem neces-
sary, and not at the whim of management. The insurgents' need to cir-
culate their material themselves is not an impediment because they would
normally do so.
Finally, a shareholder has no statutory or common law8' right to in-
spect the corporate books. This is suprising, because English company
law relies heavily on partnership principles, and complete disclosure
among partners is a fundamental principle of partnership law. 2
76 Companies Act, 1948, § 140(5).
77 There is only one possible advantage in resorting to See. 140, which pro-
vides that the circulation be at the expense of the opposition 'unless the company
otherwise resolves." If the resolution can be retrospective, i.e., passed after the insurgents
gain control, and if the general rule is that successful insurgents cannot recover in the
usual case, then it pays to take advantage of the Sec. 140 mechanism. Presumably the
resolution should be by the general meeting. It is common knowledge, however, that
the former opposition, which succeeded in the principal proxy fight, will obtain such
approval. On the other hand, when the opposition circulates its material through the
corporation it exposes itself to management. The opposition's material will have no
time to be effective before management counterattacks, possibly in the very same dis-
patch. See GowER, supra note 18, at 483.
78 Companies Act, 1948, § 132.
79 The Act requires the directors to "proceed duly to convene a meeting" within 21
days from the date of request, yet does not fix a deadline for the meeting to be held.
The Jenkins Committee recommended a deadline of 28 days from the day of the send-
ing of the notice. Jenkins Report, 468(b). This recommendation, which would insure
that the meeting be held within 49 days from the day of request, has not yet been im-
plemented.
80 This will be a reduction from their remuneration. Companies Act, 1948, § 132 (5).
81 Butt v. Kelson, [1952] Ch. 197.
82 Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARv.
L. Rsv. 1369, 1380 (1956).
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2. The United States
In the United States, shareholders have qualified common law and
statutory rights83 to inspect the shareholders list (or stock ledger) and
corporate books.84 All states require that the inspection be for a cor-
porate purpose and in good faith.s5 However, the rules vary from state
to state as to what constitutes a corporate purpose, as to who bears the
burden of proof," and as to what conditions are necessary for shifting
that burden. The courts are somewhat more lenient in enforcing com-
pliance with the right to inspect the shareholders list than with the right
to inspect the corporate books. This is explained by the greater burden
which examining the books and records places on the corporation. 8
Generally, incumbents take advantage of the fact that the rights are
conditioned on proper purpose by employing dilatory tactics.89 Thus, by
83 This discussion is limited to the availability of these rights in control battles. See
also E. ARANow & H. ENHoRN, PRoxY CoN-~rmss FOR CORPORATE CoNTmoi, Ch. 2 (2d ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as AnaAow & Ewnomt]. On the question of obtaining a share-
holders list, see W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 295-99 (abr. 4th ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as CAY]; Newman, Inspection of Stockholder Ledgers and
Voting Lists, 16 Sw. L. J. 439 (1962). On the right to inspect the corporate books and
records, see CARY at 851-58. On both rights, see N. LATIN, R. JENmNGs & R. BUXRAum,
CORPORATIONs, CASES AND MATERA.LS 417-43 (4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as LAnN,
JENNrNGS & BUXBAuJM].84 Statutes usually add a requirement that the corporation compile a list of record
stockholders and make it available to shareholders prior to the annual meeting. See, e.g.,
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoP. Aar § 29 (rev. § 31) (1969) [hereinafter cited as MBA]. See
Note, 27 U. CwNN. L. REv. 288 (1957) which criticizes the Delaware statute as inadequate
because 10 days prior to the meeting is too short a period and because the statute lacks
teeth.
85 This is true even where the statute conferring the right does not contain any
qualification.8 6 Most states, by statute, place the burden in regard to the shareholders list on the
corporation. E.g., M.B.A. § 46 (rev. § 51); DEL. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 220; Barnhill, The
Corporate Raider: Contesting Proxy Solicitations and Takeover Offers, 20 Bus. LAw
763, 766 (1965).
87 Typical conditions are a qualification period and a minimum holding. In New
York, for example, 5% holding and six-month qualification (as of record) shift the
burden regarding a shareholders list. CARY, supra note 81 at 297. A qualification period
and minimum holding are sometimes preconditions to the right to inspect books itself.
MBA § 46.
88 Durnin v. Allentown Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716 (D.C. Pa.
1963); Goldman v. Trans-United Indus., Inc., 404 Pa. 288, 171 A.2d 788 (1961). HOWn-
STEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRAcrcE, § 611, p. 126 (1959, Supp. 1968); ARAnow & EIN-
HoRN, supra note 81 at 41.
89 Stephan, Highlights of the -Montgomery Ward Proxy Contest from a Lawyer's
Viewpoint, 11 Bus. LAW. 86, 89-90 (1955). Practitioners representing insurgents try to
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the time the insurgent can win a suit to compel inspection, the incum-
bents have initiated their own campaign. Therefore, the enunciated
rules of what constitutes a proper purpose do not reflect the extent to
which inspection rights are available.
It is well settled that waging a proxy battle is a proper purpose for
obtaining a shareholders list,90 and although decisions concerning take-
over bids are less conclusive, the majority opinion holds that such a pur-
pose is also proper." Acting under a common law right, the party re-
questing a shareholder list must sustain the burden of proof. If the plain-
tiff can rely on a statute, the corporation must show that his real motive
is improper. Collateral improper motives in addition to a proper motive
do not frustrate the right.92 In an attempt to avoid the common law re-
bring the suit for inspection in New York, if they can establish jurisdiction, because
the New York courts are known to be effective enforcers of the inspection rights.
Stephan, id., at 90. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE, § 619 (1959, Supp. 1968).
90 There is no decision squarely in point that this is a proper purpose for inspecting
the corporate books and records.
91 Hauser v..York Water Co., 278 Pa. 387, 123 A. 330 (1924), and Hanrahan v. Puget
Sound Power & Light Co., 332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d 499 (1955), establish a common
law right to a list for proxy battles. Cf. Goldman v. Trans-United Indus, Inc., 404 Pa.
288, 171 A.2d 788 (1961), where the court endorsed the right to obtain a list for proxy
solicitation yet held the list may be refused if the insurgent plans to obtain control by
deflating the value of the shares. See also General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus, Inc,
240 A.2d 755 (Del. 1968). Several recent cases upheld the statutory right to obtain a
list for purchasing shares. E. L. Bruce Co. v. State ex rel. Gilbert, 144 A.2d 533 (Del.
1958); Florida Tel. Corp. v. State ex rel. Peninsular Tel. Corp., 111 So. 2d 677 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1959); Murchinson v. Allegheny Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 290, 210 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup.
Ct. 1960), aff'd mem., 210 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1961), appeal den. 212 N.Y.S.2d 997,
(App. Div. 1961). Crane, in its unsuccessful attempt to take over Westinghouse Air
Brake, tried to secure a shareholders list. A Pennsylvania court held that the Westing-
house management was warranted in denying Crane a list sought in order to effect a
merger not in the corporate interest. A New York court has later ruled that Crane had
a right to obtain a list in order to prevent a safe harbor merger of Westinghouse. Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 56 Misc. 2d 538, 28g N.Y.S.2d 984 (1968). Cf. Kahn
v. American Cone & Pretzel Co, 365 Pa. 161, 74 A.2d 160 (1950). One New York de-
cision held that if the sole use of the list is to make a tender offer, management may
deny the list. Laidlaw & Co. v. Pacific Ins. Co., 52 Misc. 2d 122, 275 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup.
Ct. 1966). If an insurgent maintains, however, that he wants not only to make a bid but
also to communicate with shareholders, he has a right to obtain a list. A. FIErSCHER & J.
FLOm (eds.), TEXAs GUF SumtiwR-INsIDER TRADING DisctosunR PROBLEM, 584-86
(PLI 1968) [hereinafter cited as TGs-INssmE DiscLosuRE PRoBLmmms]. In Delaware, Mite
Corp. v. Hell-Coil Corp, 256 A.2d 855 (Del. Ch. 1969), recently reiterated bidder's
rights.
92 General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 240 A.2d 755 (Del. 1968). Hanrahan v.
Puget Sound Power & Light Co, 332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d 499 (1955).
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strictions on the right of inspection, several states have enacted Statutes
that do not limit this right. The courts, however, have read even into
such statutes a proviso that the list can be denied upon a showing of
improper motive.93
The American courts' recognition of the shareholder's common law
right to inspect corporate books and records, while such right -was re-
fused in England, can be explained in part by the surprisingly small
amount of information that American states4 require corporation's to
supply to their shareholders. 5 Few states require that annual reports
be filed with a state agency;"" some require annual filing to stock-
holders;97 and others require the furnishing of financial reports to stock-
hoders upon request."" With such statutory provisions, the only way to
gain information is through access to the corporate books and records,99
and the scope of the "books and records" open to inspection'is somewhat
93 E.g., Dines v. Harris, 88 Colo. 22, 291 P. 1024 (1930), and Slay v. Polonia Pub.
Co., 248 Mich. 609, 229 N.W. 434 (1930). The rationale of the courts was that since the
remedy for enforcing the right is the discretionary remedy of mandamus, their discre-
tion is not fettered.- Other jurisdictions have given the statutes their literal meaning,
upholding the rights of competitors. This, in turn, has led to corrective legislation. E.g.,
Furst v. W. T. Rawleigh Medical Co., 282 Ill. 366, 118 N.E. 763 (1918); Pick v. Wesbar
Stamping Corp, 238 Wis. 93, 298 N.W. 58 (1941). LATThN, JENNMnGS & BuxBAum, supra
note 83, at 424; 5 FLETcER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORAIIONS, § 2220 (perm. ed. 1967, rev. vol.)
[hereinafter cited as F=arcFai]; Note, Corporations-Stockholder's Right To Inspect
Books-Recent Statutory Amendment, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 292. Note also the tightening
of the Delaware provision, which at one time read like the English provision.
94The Securities And Exchange Commission has recently replaced the semiannual
9-K report with a new quarterly 10-Q report. S-cuams EXcHAKcE Acr RELzAsa No.
9004, Oct. 28, 1970, CCH FED. SFc. L. RaP. 77.
')'See GowER, supra note 18, at 454 for a description of the English statutory require-
ments of financial reports. In England only directors have a free right of access to the
corporate books and records. Companies Act, 1948, § 147 (3). A shareholder in England
has an absolute right to inspect the minutes of general meetings only. Id. § 146.
06 These are Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan and Missouri. See, FLErciEM, supra
note 93, §§ 2258-59; LATrN, JENNiNGS & BUXBAUm, supra note 83, 417 n.l.; Legis, Dis-
closure of Corporate Affairs, 47 HARv. L. Rav. 335 (1933).
07 Ouio GEN. CoRP. LAW § 1701.38 (1971). A report must also be furnished on request.
Id. In California, the requirement is subject to a contrary provision in the bylaws. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 3006 (1955).
oS E.g, CAL. CoP. CODE § 3013 (1955). The right is often conditioned on the holding
of a certain percentage of stock. Id. § 3011; FLETCHER, supra note 93, § 2272.1; LATINN,
JENN Gs & BUXBAUm, supra note 83, 417 n.5.
09 The Michigan provision, Bus. CoRP. LAW § 21.45, amplifies the relation between
financial reports and the right of inspection. Shareholders eligible for inispection may
require a sworn statement "embracing a particular account of its [the corporation's]
operations and properties in reasonable detail."
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unsettled. It includes not only the corporate constitution, minute books,
stock books, and all the records containing financial information,100 but
also contracts and other documents relating to the corporate business. 1°1
It does not include, however, information prepared for management's
use, drafts of financial reports, 02 or confidential data supplied by a
merging party. 03
Until recently, American statutes left to the corporate constitutions
to provide whether shareholders can initiate a general meeting.1°4 In
many instances, the constitutions did not delineate such a right, which
prevented minority shareholders from expressing their views to fellow
incorporators on a proposed course for the corporation. 05 Further, even
if an insurgent faction mustered a majority'06 of the voting power, it
could not unseat the incumbents until the end of their term of office. 10 7
100 Kemp v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 128 N.J.. 322, 26 A.2d 70 (1942); State
ex rel Cowell v. Helen Shop, Inc, 211 Tenn. 107, 362 S.W.2d 787 (1962).
101 Kemp v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 128 N.J.L. 322, 26 A.2d 70 (1942).
102 State ex rel. Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 358 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1962).
103 State ex rel. Armour Co. v. Gulf Sulphur Corp., 223 A.2d 457 (Del. Super. Ct.
1967), aff'd 231 A.2d 470 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1967).
104 It has been generally assumed in the United States that shareholders do not have
a right, aside from the right under 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8, to have their proposals for
corporate action circulated by the corporate proxy machinery. Eisenberg, supra note 57,
at 1520, argues that shareholders do have a right "to submit proposals which are within
the shareholders' authority to initiate-at least in a corporation in which there is a
custom of submitting proposals to shareholders through the proxy materials." Eisenberg
contends that Carter v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 227 Ore. 401, 362 P.2d 766 (1961), is
not a persuasive authority against his proposition. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1522-24.
Eisenberg, furthermore, argues that, in an election contest, insurgents have a right
that the corporate (incumbents') proxy material include insurgents' designated candi-
dates for directorship. Id. at 1505. Eisenberg's theme is that, since "the proxy system
is today's shareholders' meeting, the right (under the statutes of all the states) to nom-
inate directors carries with it access to the proxy materials for that purpose." Id.
105 Being able to call a shareholders' meeting is not sufficient for initiating a corporate
action even if such action needs shareholder approval. The corporate statutes leave
certain matters to be initiated only by the directors. E.g., a sale of substantially all the
assets, MBA § 72 (rev. § 79); voluntary dissolution, MBA § 77 (rev. § 84); and merger,
MBA § 65 (rev. § 71). Under the MBA, shareholders may initiate amendment of the
by-laws if the charter reserves to the shareholders the power (rev. § 27), but they may
not initiate amendment of the charter (rev. § 58).
106A provision like DEL. GFN. Coat'. LAw § 228 (1969) that a majority by written
consent can substitute for a general meeting enables majority insurgents to circumvent
this obstacle.
107 If the corporation has a staggered board and it takes more than a simple majority
to amend the by-laws, a successful tender offer for more than 50% of the shares does
not secure control.
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Only recently have legislatures begun to confer upon minority share-
holders the right to have a general meeting convened. 0 8
3. Comparison
The English rule requiring that a shareholders' register be open to
public inspection is superior to the American rules. However, to in-
sure current accuracy, vital in corporate control battles, the English rule
should be improved by making daily updating a statutory requirement.
The English experience is that the right of inspection has not been
abused, nor can it easily be abused. Conditioning the inspection on pro-
priety of purposes and motives as do the American rules destroys the
right. The American practice of "selling" 109 a list is a by-product of
the restricting rules. The list is of value only because it is not publicly
available. What damage can be inflicted if a "competitor" or a
Moreover, the term of office of the incumbents may actually continue beyond the
date on which the next annual meeting is due; if the incumbents fail to convene the
meeting, they gain several additional months until they can be legally forced to convene
the meeting.
A recent English case underscores the difference between English and American law
on the subject. An American corporation took over an English corporation, had an
extraordinary meeting convened, and replaced the directors. However, the American
corporation found itself impotent to cause the convening of a general meeting of a 70%
American subsidiary of the English corporation to remove the latter's board. Pergamon
Press Ltd. v. Maxwell, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1167. See also note 20 supra.
108 MBA § 26 (rev. § 28) provides for ten percent of the shareholders to have the
right to call a special meeting. Accord: MAss. LAw ch. 156B, § 34 (1970); GEN. STAT.
N.C. § 55-61(c) (1965). Other states confer the right only to holders of 20%: e.g., CA..
CoRP. CoDn ANN. § 2202 (1955). Maryland confers the right upon 25% of the share-
holders. MD. Aar. CODE art. 23 § 38(c) (1970). Omo REv. CoDn ANN. § 1701.40(a)
follows Maryland but allows the corporate constitution to decrease or increase the per-
centage, provided it does not exceed 50%.
The state of New York has not yet acted in this direction. N.Y. Bus. Corn,. LAW §
602(c) (McKinney 1963) provides that special meetings 'may be called by the board
and by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation
of the bylaws." Note that in Pergamon once the acquirer succeeded in convening a
general meeting of the subsidiary, he would have prevailed. Even if the corporate con-
stitution of the subsidiary did not allow removal without cause, he could have had the
general meeting amend the by-laws to include such a provision. (Such an amendment
would be valid under § 601 as amended in 1965.) § 706 (b) states that "if the certificate
of incorporation or the by-laws so provide, any or all of the directors may be removed
without cause by vote of the shareholders." N.Y. Bus. Coin. LAw § 706(b) (McKinney
1963).
109 State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 A. 773 (1922), held that
obtaining a list to sell is an improper purpose which frustrates the right of inspection.
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"raider" 110 obtains a list? Refusing a list virtually deprives shareholders
of a free choice in electing management and in other shareholders'
actions.
The corporate books and records are another matter. The normal
channel of information to shareholders should be the annual financial
reports, and defects in the rules regulating these reports should be met
squarely. Although corporate books and records contain business
secrets and cannot be made available automatically to any share-
holder, secreting them might lead to mismanagement and perpetuation
of control. Thus, a provision for a qualified right is necessary. In the
United States, where the, losing party does not pay his adversary's at-
torney's fees, it is the corporation (i.e., the incumbents) that should bear
the burden of showing the insurgents' improper purpose for the, latter's
right to injure the corporation. In England,"" the burden might be
placed on the insurgent, not only because he is the plaintiff, but also
because he has superior knowledge about his own purposes and motives.
B. Removal of Directors
Related to the right of shareholders to convene a general meeting are
the causes and voting power necessary to remove a director during his
term of office. 112  Two fundamental rules of corporate law conflict to
make difficult the question concerning grounds for removal. On one
hand, because the management of the corporation is entrusted to the di-
rectors,1" 3 the shareholders may not instruct the directors as to the man-
ner in which they should run the business," 4 and a right to remove
110 These terms, plus "pirates," "looters," and "scavengers" are some of the most com-
mon terms used to describe insurgents, especially in the context of takeover bids.
III It is the position of the author that there is room for the introduction of a qualified
right to inspect corporate books and records in England.
-112 Another advantage possessed by incumbents is the leeway they have in fixing
the date of the annual meeting. A recent American decision upheld the convening of
an annual meeting eight months after the earlier one, despite the insurgents' charge
that this was a move to stave off an emerging proxy battle. Mansdorf v. Unexcelled,
Inc., 28 App. Div. 44, 281 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. 1967). Cf. Northwest Indus. v. B.F.
Goodrich Co, 301 F. Supp. 706, 709, n.7 (N.D. IM. 1969).
113 In the United States this is normally done by a statutory provision. See MBA §
33 (rev. § 35). In England the statutes are silent, and it is customary for the articles of
association to set out such a rule. Table A, Companies Act, 1948, § 80.
The articles of incorporation may provide for a different allocation of power. MBA §
33 (rev. § 35). This is rarely done in publicly held companies.
"14Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, [19061 2 Ch. 34;
Salmon v. Quin & Axtents Ltd., [1909] 1 Ch. 311, aff'd [1909] A.C. 442; Shaw & Sons
[Vol. 7:431440
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directors at any time without cause comes painfully close to allowing
the shareholders to instruct puppet directors in the management of the
business." 5 On the other hand, the ultimate control that shareholders
possess over management is their right to hire and fire, and depriving
shareholders of the right to remove at will renders corporate democracy
a mockery.""' The stricter the requirement of a special majority for
removal, the more entrenched directors become during their term of
office. The following sections analyze English and American solutions
or proposed solutions of this dilemma.
1. England
Until 1947, the English Companies Act did not regulate the voting
power needed for removing a director. It was customary for companies
to provide that only by extraordinary or special resolution might a di-
rector be removed." The company law revision committee, known as
the Cohen Committee, recommended strengthening shareholders' con-
trol over directors,118 and to achieve that result Section 184 of the 1948
Act was passed. Section 184(1) provides that "a company may by ordi-
nary resolution'" remove a director before the expiration of his period
(Salford) Ltd. v. Shaw, [1935] 2 K.B. 113; Scott v. Scott, [1943] I All. E.R. 582; Charlei-
town Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85 (1880). This principle has been rein-
stated lately in the Bamford case. See generally Slutsky, The Relationship Between
the Board of Directors and the Shareholders in General Meeting, 3 B.C.L. REv. 81
(1968).
115 LArr, CoRPomAnoNs 213-14 (1959) emphasizes this point.
110 Ballantine, in discussing the principle that, unless a statute or the corporate con-
stitution permits, directors cannot be removed during incumbency without cause, calls
this an "unsound rule" because it infringes upon corporate democracy. H. BALLAN INE,
CORPORATIONS 434 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited as BAriANTn].
The justification for the principle is that directors, "Unlike ordinary agents, occupy a
unique position as top echelon officers of the corporation." LAT=I, id.
It has also been .argued that allowing removal of directors 'is a "double-edged'
sword." In public corporations, directors usually have effective control over general
meetings, and they will utilize the removal power to get rid of nonconforming colleagues.
Beuthin,' A Director Firmly in the Saddle, 86 S. AFR. L.J. 489 (1969).
117 Another customary provision was that directors could not be removed during-
office. Bushell v. Faith, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 272, 276. The practical impact of the two
provisions was identical since it took a 3:1 vote to pass an extraordinary or 9pecial
resolution and to amend the articles.
138 REPORT OF THE COMITTEE ON CoMPANY LAW AMENDmENT, CD. 6659, 124 (1945.)
[hereinafter cited as the CoF.N REPoRT]
. 9' ",Ordinary -resolutiore' is -hbt -defined in the Companies -Act. The term is used to
mean that a bare majority of the votes cast is needed to pass the resolution.,Specfid or'
extraordinary resolutions need a three-quarters, majority to pass.
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of office, notwithstanding anything in its articles, or in any agreement
between it and him." 120 The section, which further requires special
notice of the proposed removal and election of a replacement to be sent
to voting shareholders,'21 means that advance notice must be given four
weeks prior to the meeting by the person making the proposal to the
company, and by the company to the shareholders.man The company
must send a copy of the removing resolution to the concerned director,
who has a right to be heard on the resolution at the meeting, 23 and who
can require the company to circulate his defense representation among
the shareholders at corporate expense.124 Nevertheless, the company or
any other aggrieved party may apply to the court for permission to deny
the director's right of circulation because "it is being abused to secure
needless publicity for defamatory matter." 1 5 These procedural safe-
guards for the directors do not apply when the corporate constitution
permits removal by a simple majority without these safeguards.12
Recently, the English courts have faced the difficult problem whether
Section 184 can be circumvented by arming the incumbent directors
with rights sufficient to defeat their removal. 1'2 In the case of Bushell
v. Faith,128 the incumbent took refuge in an article of association that
weighted the voting power of directors for the sole purpose of defeating
120 The removal may be a breach of a service contract. The incumbents might well
arm themselves with service contracts that would make their dismissal costly. Com-
panies Act, 1947, § 184 does not interfere with the contractual rights of the director.
GowEa, supra note 18, at 134-36.
121 Companies Act, 1948, § 184(2).
12 2 Id. at § 142. If a written personal notice is sent, the period is two weeks; if
another channel of communication is used, the period is three weeks. Id. at 5§ 142,
133 (2) (b).
128 Id. at § 184(2).
124 Id. at 5 184(3). If the company does not comply, the director has a right to have
his circular read at the meeting in addition to his right to address the meeting. It seems
that the substitution right is useless, since by the time of the meeting, the impeaching
faction may very well have obtained sufficient proxies to carry the vote. Hopefully,
should the matter come before the courts, they would adjourn the meeting and decree
compliance by the company rather than permit the violator to redeem himself so cheaply.
126 Id.
126This is because Companies Act, 1947, 5 5184(2) & (3) refer only to removal reso-
lutions under § 184. GowER, supra note 18, at 134, n.59 § 184(6) specifically preserves
more far-reaching removal powers under the corporate constitution.
127 A voting agreement is another valid device for circumventing the section. Stewart
v. Schwag, 1956(4) S.A. 791 (Trans. PD.). See Beuthin, A Director Firmly in the
Saddle, 86 S. Ara. L.J. 489 (1969).
128 [1970] 2 WL.R. 272, approving [1969] 2 Ch. 438.
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a removal resolution. Although the incumbent held only one-third of
the outstanding shares, he outvoted the controlling shareholders and re-
mained in office. The House of Lords decided subsequently that the
article in question did not run afoul of Section 184(1). 12' The decision
of the majority in the House of Lords was labeled by one scholar as de-
riving from an application of "desolating logic." 130 The circumstances
in Bushell v. Faith did not call for strict construction. In an attempt to
circumvent Section 184(1), an article granting a veto power to direc-
tors relative to their removal, instead of providing that "a director may
veto his removal," the court said that "in the event of a resolution . . .
for the removal from office of any director, any shares held by that di-
rector shall . . . carry the right to three votes per share." The court
could easily have rewritten the article and decided that it ran contrary
to Section 184(1). The fact that multiple voting rights are not con-
demned does not compel a conclusion that every utilization of weighted
voting rights is valid. Thus, when the avowed objective of a gimmick
is to prevent removal where Parliament stated that removal will ensue,
a court should have no problem in implementing Parliament's will. In
short, the reasoning of Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest and of Justice
Ungoed-Thomas is much more appealing than that of their brethren.
Bushell v. Faith suggests that if the incumbents can succeed in passing
two articles, one giving them a veto against their removal and the other
safeguarding the first article from any possible amendments (in both
cases, by means of loaded voting rights rather than a merely personal
veto), a shareholder who purchases even more than 75% of the shares
will have to wait until the term of office of the incumbents expires be-
fore he can achieve control. During their term of office, management
129The rationale of the Court of Appeal and of the House of Lords was that as long
as multiple and restricted voting rights are generally recognized, no different rule can
apply to voting rights weighted specifically for blocking a removal resolution. Only
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest endorsed the reasoning of Ungoed-Thomas J. of the
Chancery Division (not reported), who held that the purpose of the article in question
was to make a director irremovable and that it was tantamount to a requirement that
more than a simple majority be necessary for a removal.
Russell, L. J, in the Court of Appeal and Lord Reid in the House of Lords expressed
an obiter that voting rights weighted only for defeating an amendment of the articles
are valid also. The other justices did not address themselves to this issue. It seems,
however, that the principle espoused in Bushell v. Faith, that loading the voting powerfor a particular resolution is valid, compels the same result as regards Section 10. Section
10 enables a company to amend its articles by a special resolution.
18 0 Gollice, Note on Bushell v. Faith, 28 CaMsnmE LJ. 41, 42 (1970).
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could completely control the company with perhaps only nominal
ownership, depriving the concept of "shareholders' democracy" of its
meaning. 31
2. The United States
American shareholders have an inherent common law right to remove
directors for cause, even if such right is not expressly stated in the cor-
porate constitution. 2 Whether or not there is a specific provision to
this effect, an opportunity to be heard must be given to the concerned
director. The courts will pass on both the adequacy of the opportunity
to explain the charges and the question of whether the charges indeed
constitute a cause for removal.133  Removal without cause is possible
only if there is a permissive clause in the governing statute or in the
corporate constitution. 3 4 Only a few states have adopted the optional
provision of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBA), 13' which
states that a majority of shareholders may remove directors without
cause,136 and other states have provided by statute that such removal will
be valid if the charter contains a permissive provision.137 The effect of
the latter statute is to prevent a contention that removal without cause
violates the statutory provision that the business shall be managed by the
131 This analysis assumes that clauses granting a class vote to a "class" of shareholders
to block an amendment to the articles which affects their rights are valid, and that
directors constitute a "class" worthy of such a protecting clause. The validity of such
protecting clauses had been assumed until the issue recently arose in Australia. While
one case upheld an article conferring a class vote (Crumpton v. Morrine Hall Pty.
Ltd., (1965) 82 W.N. (Pt. 1) (N.S.W.) 456), a second found it of no avail (Fischer v.
Easthaven Ltd. (1963) 80 W.N. (N.S.W.) 1155). Both cases are discussed in Baxt, The
Variation of Class Rights, 41 AusT. L.J. 490 (1968). See Prentice, Removal of Directors
from Office, 32 MOD. L. Rv. 693, 696 (1969). On the question of blocking amendment
of articles, see also Hahlo, Restrictions on the Alteration of Articles, 86 S. AYR. L.J, 349
(1969).
132 Campbell v. Loew's, inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957); Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y.
427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954); Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 281 N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct.'
1935); Koch v. Wadsworth, 257 N.Y.318, 178 N.E. 545 (1931).
133 See cases cited note 132 supra.
134 See the references in CARY, supra note 83, at 128 it.7.
135 MBA § 36 A (rev. § 39).1 36 CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 810 (1955); GEN. STAT. N.C. § 55-27(f). The provisions .
prevent circumvention of cumulative voting. If there is cumulative voting, a removal
resolution against which sufficient votes to elect the director were cast is invalid. Cumula-
tive voting is nonexistent in England'. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and
American. Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1390 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
Gower].
137 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 706 (b)' (McKinney 1963).
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board. In most states, even today a successful bidder must wait until the
annual meeting to place himself in control. Commenting on this ar-
rangement, Professor Gower in 1956 wrote that the rule prevailing in
most American states seemed strange,'31 and his comment has lost none
of its force with age.
3. Comparison
English law is superior in this respect to the American system, and
'hopefully, more American states will implement the provisions of the
Model Business Corporation Act. Even so, English provisions are not
perfect, as shown by the case of Bushell v. Faith, and there is room for
tightening Section 184 to prevent circumventing devices.
C. Proxy Regulation
1. England
When the legislature finally regulated' 9 proxies in 1947,10 it also
broached the questions herein considered. Management can send proxies
and proxy statements at the corporation's expense, and designate its
nominees as proxies.141 However, if "invitations to appoint as proxy a
person or one of a number of persons specified in the invitations are
issued at the company's expense," they must be sent to all shareholders
alike and not just to those friendly to management." The proxy can
be a one-way proxy. 43 Aside from the common law rules concerning
138 Gower, supra note 136, at 1389.
139 This discussion is included here to provide an overview of access to the proxy
machinery by incumbents and insurgents. Because this material is a subject in itself,
only a brief discussion appears here. See also pp. 433-34 supra for a discussion of the
English shareholders' proposal rule.
140 Most of the recommendations of the Cohen Committee (CosaN REPoRT, i 132-34)
were implemented by Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act, reenacted in § 136 of the 1948 Companies
Act. The section entitles every shareholder to appoint a proxy, whether or not a mem-
ber, who in private companies may also speak at the meeting. § 136(1). A proxy may
vote only at a poll. § 136(1) (c). The shareholder's right to appoint a proxy must
be stated prominently in the notice calling for the meeting. § 136(2). See further
GowER, supra note 18, at 434-87.
14' Companies Act, 1948, § 136(4).
142 Id. This reverses the common law rule of Wilson v. L.M.S. Ry., [1940] Ch. 393.
143 The British Federated Stock'Exchanges require a two-way proxy by listed com-
panies. Srocn EXCHANGE RuLns, Sch. VIII, Part A, 14. The Cohen Conimittee refused
to recommend such a statutory rule, fearing its rigidity, and preferred to leave the
matter with the exchanges, which can apply the rule flexibly. CoEN REPoRT, CMD.
6659, f 132 (1945). The Jenkins Committee recommended that a'statutory requirement
of a two-way proxy be enacted. JFmNcNs REPORT, V 464.-
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fraudulent and negligent statements,'1 there is no regulation of the con-
tent of the proxy material.
2. The United States
The "proxy section" of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, Section
14(a)," 5 was designed to promote the suffrage rights of shareholders,
and to insure a higher standard of conduct by management. 146  State
laws, securing only the right to appoint a proxy, did not regulate the
procuration of proxies.147 Abuses by management of their control of
the proxy machinery148 led to a national regulation. Section 14(a), lay-
ing only the foundation, made it unlawful to solicit proxies in interstate
commerce in contravention of proxy rules to be promulgated by the
SEC "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors." At first, the proxy rules required only adequate
information and full disclosure by shareholders. However, it soon be-
came SEC policy to facilitate the opposition's presentation of its views
to shareholders in order to achieve "fair corporate suffrage." "I Hence,
Rule 14a-715 ° requires management, which solicits proxies, either to
144 Gower, supra note 136, at 1393 wrote: "[Tlhe common law rule banning trick
or misleading circulars [is] a rule which the English courts have perhaps developed
further than the American." Examination of the American common law reveals that the
Americans do not really lag behind. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1492-93, n.13, gathers
the references.
'45 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
148H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1934).
'47 Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MicH. L. REv. 38, 46-48 (1942). This in itself was a
breakthrough from the common law rule that allowed voting by proxy only if thecorporate constitution so provided. id., at 38-46. Today each state secures the right to
vote by proxy. L. Loss, SEcuRIrms REGuLA-IoNs 857-58 n.1 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Loss].
Today there is state proxy regulation, modeled on the SEC proxy rules, as regards
insurance companies. This is done to enable the insurance industry to avoid the effect
of the 1934 Act, since § 12(g) (2) (G) (I) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 1(g) (2) (G)
(II) (1964), conditions the exemption from the 1934 Act on such state regulation.
For state regulation of any corporation, see the rules of California, CAL. CoRP. CoDE
ANN. § 3637 (1955), the pioneer in this area.
148 See note 146 supra.
141 For a description of the development, see Friedman, S.E.C. Regulation of Cor-
porate Proxies, 63 H~Av. L. REv. 796, 808 (1950). Loss 121-31. Yet, as Eisenberg, supra
note 57, stated, even today "the Proxy Rules deal elaborately with the information that
must accompany a proxy solicitation, but only tangentially with access to the corporate
proxy machinery." Id. at 1493.
150 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1971).
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supply a shareholders list to any voting shareholder, or forward his
proxy material to shareholders on the latter's account. Doubtless man-
agement will choose to forward the material instead of providing a
shareholders list.' In the latter instance, shareholders are not exposed
to personal solicitation by the insurgents. However, Rule 14a-7 does not
preempt the common law right to obtain a shareholders list for a cor-
porate purpose, 52 but enables insurgents to bring their campaign to
shareholders and still fight management for the shareholders list in court.
Another rule, Rule 14a-8, 53 gives the insurgents a "free ride" on the
corporate treasury. Any voting stockholder can compel management
to include in its proxy statement a proposal-1s that is a "proper subject
for action by security holders" under the laws of the corporation's domi-
cile.' 5  If management opposes the proposal, it is also obliged to include
'(; Loss 890-94.
152 § 28 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 73 bb (1964). Wood, Walker & Co. v. Evans,
300 F. Supp. 171 (D. Colo. 1969); Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 56 Misc. 2d
538, 288 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1968).
153 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1971).
154 There are two important limitations on the scope of the rule. First, it does not
apply to elections for office. Second, it does not extend to counter-representations to
managements proposals. Id. The English scheme, discussed in pp. 433-34 supra, does not
contain any of these restrictions. Rule 14a-8 also contains safeguards against abuses by
repetitious harassing proposals. See Rules 14a-8(c) (3) & (4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ina-8(3)
& (4) (1971).
-55 Rule 14a-8(c) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-S(c) (1) (1971). It is a difficult question
whether the propriety of the proposal should be decided under federal or state law.
See S.E.C. v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947) cert. denied 332 U.S.
847 (1948); Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); The Dyer
cases, especially Dyer v. S.E.C., 289 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1961) and Dyer v. S.E.C., 266
F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1959). For references to S.E.C. decisions and to writings, see Eisen-
berg, supra note 57, at 1523 n.133.
Rules 14a-8(2) and 14a-8(5) go further in restricting the shareholders' proposal rule.
The former excludes proposals submitted "for the purpose of enforcing a personal
claim or redressing a personal grievance against the issuer or the management, or
primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious,
social or similar causes." The latter excludes proposals consisting of "a recommendation
or request that the management take action with respect to a matter relating to the
conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer."
The eligibility of two recent, celebrated proposals revolved around these rules. The
first involved Ralph Nader's Project on Corporate Responsibility proposals for General
Motors' 1970 annual meeting. See Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Reflec-
tions on Campaign GM, 69 MicH. L. REv. 421 (1971). The second involved the Medical
Committee for Human Rights' proposal that Dow Chemical stop manufacturing napalm.
Although the SEC held the management was warranted in refusing to include this
proposal in its proxy statement, a court held that it had the power to review the SEC
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in its proxy statement a statement of the proponent in support of the
proposal in not more than 100 words. Certain aspects of Rule 14a-8 go
further than its English counterpart: 156  the presentation of opposing
views is at corporate expense; the right is given to every voting share-
holder; and the right is not limited to annual meetings. On the other
hand, the English section allows a statement of 1,000 words, while the
American rule allows only 100 words.' 57 As in many other areas, the
English lag in enforcement devices. In a clear case of unjustified refusal
by management, the SEC will obtain an injunction against management's
solicitation, but in England, the shareholder himself must go to court in
all cases.
Other aspects of the proxy rules also merit mention. The proxy rules
apply not only to all listed companies, but since 1964, to those com-
panies whose gross assets exceed $1,000,000 and which have at least
500 holders of record of equity securities.158 The rules apply to all the
decision. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. S.E.C., CCH Fyn. Sac. L. RE'. t 92,708
(C.A.D.C. 1970).
Anticipating that an increase in the number of shareholders' proposals will result, the
SEC is now reconsidering the proxy rules. CCH FED. SEc. L. REt., Report Letter No.
337, p. 5, Nov. 11, 1970. See also the letter of the SEC Division of Corporate Regulation
directing the Fidelity Trend Mutual fund to include in its proxy material a controversial
shareholders' proposal. The proposal would require fund managers to consider, in de-
ciding whether to invest in a certain corporation, the corporation's record on pollution
control, minority hiring, and operations in South Africa and Rhodesia. CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 78,070. See generally Bane, Shareholders Proposals on Public Issues, 26 Bus.
LAw 1017 (1971); Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of Shareholder Proposals, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 700 (1971).
The English section does not explicitly contain similar restrictions. However, it ap-
plies only to resolutions to be moved at the meeting. The division of power between
shareholders (general meeting) and directors will probably be read into the section to
restrict the qualifying proposals.
156 Companies Act, 1948, § 140.
157This enables "the statement to be expressed in reasonable English instead of jingle-
ese." Gower, supra note 136, at 1393.
158 1934 Act, §§ 12(a) & 12(g), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 1(a) & (g) (1964). The proxy rules
apply also to shares of registered investment companies and registered holding com-
panies and their subsidiaries. INVESTMENT COMPANIES Aar, Rule 20a-I(a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.20a-I(a) (1969); PuBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIEs Acr, Rules 60-61, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 250.60-61 (1969). The Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, and the Comptroller of the Currency promulgated similar rules for the banks
that they regulate.
Until 1964, Gower's criticism of the American scheme in which incumbents may
solicit selectively or forgo soliciting and thus defeat the disclosure philosophy of the
proxy rules was valid. Gower, supra note 136, at 1393. § 14(c), enacted in 1964, requires
that nonsolicited shareholders be supplied by the corporation with "information sub-
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factions in a contest. Insurgents have one concession: Rule 14a-2 (a) 159
enables them to solicit ten persons or less without being subject to the
proxy rules.
The courts allow each faction standing to complain about the other.
After standing was established for shareholders who themselves were
not deceived by the alleged violation,6 0 came the landmark decision of
the Supreme Court in 1. 1. Case Co. v. Borak.1'6 Borak firmly established
that private rights may be implied from violations of the proxy rules.
Shortly thereafter, the Second Circuit in Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin'
decided that management may enjoin violations of the proxy rules. Al-
though Gittlin may seem merely to apply the Borak holding to its own
facts, it in fact embodies far-reaching implications, stating that manage-
ment as such has a role to play in the enforcement of the proxy rules.
Gittlin involved a proxy solicitation by the plaintiff to gather sufficient
shares to qualify him under the New York provision for obtaining a share-
holders list, as a prelude to a proxy fight for board representation. The
court observed that damage to the corporation was possible because a con-
trol battle is often only the first stage in initiating a possibly damaging
transaction, even without further resort to the proxy machinery. In fact,
when considering whether the corporation had proved irreparable harm,
a traditional condition for an injunction, the court held that the violation
of the proxy rules per se constitutes such harm. The court did not even
purport to consider the opposing view of allowing standing to the cor-
poration, i.e., to the incumbent management. Its approach was totally
pro-management. Citing the famous quotation from the Senate Report
concerning "irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control of a cor-
poration away from honest and conscientious corporation officials," 168
the court concluded that the target management is not intended to
"maintain a posture of strict neutrality" :1 in a control contest. In-
stead, the court allowed it to use the corporate treasury in its fight
against the "raiders."
stantially equivalent to the information which would be required to be transmitted if a
solicitation were made." SEcuRTms EXCHANGF Acr § 14(c), 78 Stat. 565 (1964).
159 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (a) (1971).
' 00 Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 209-11 (6th Cir. 1961); Union
Pacific R. R. v. Chicago & North Western Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
101 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
162 Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
103 S. REe. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934).
164 360 F.2d at 695.
44919731
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:431
Section 13(d)," 5 added by the Williams Act,-"6 and reinforced by
Rules 13d-1 through 13d-3,'167 also buttresses the defensive arsenal of
the incumbents. 168  This section requires an insurgent who purchases
shares registered under Section 12169 of the 1934 Act or shares of a
closed-end investment company to file with the SEC, with target man-
agement, and with the Stock Exchange, a Schedule 13D, if the purchase
results in his becoming a beneficial owner of more than five percent 7°
of the shares of the class. Avoidance of Section 13 (d) is not possible by
purchasing more than two percent during any twelve months.'
For purposes of Section 13 (d), two or more persons acting as a part-
nership, limited partnership, syndicate, "or other group for the purpose
of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer" are deemed
a person.' This takes the "group" idea further than it generally applies
in the 1934 Act by virtue of the definition of person in Section
3(a)(9)."' Under Section 16(a), 7 4 a person who becomes a 10%
holder of any equity security registered under Section 12 must file
with the SEC and with the Stock Exchange a statement disclosing the
amount of all equity securities held by him, and he must thereafter report
changes in his holdings. Section 13 (d) imposes heavier burdens. First,
holdings of different persons must be aggregated for the purpose of
Section 13(d) but not for Section 16(a). Second, the disclosure re-
quired under Section 13(d) is more detailed and revealing than that
under Section 16(a). Under Section 13 (d), the insurgent must disclose
the purpose of the purchase, and if the purpose is to acquire control,
165 15 U.S.C. 78m(d) (Supp. IV 1969).
166 PuB. LAW No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) amending the 1934 SEcuRrrrEs EXCHANGE
AcT, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (Supp. IV 1969).
167 For an application of § 13(d) to restrain incumbents see the complaint filed by
the SEC in S.E.C. v. Posner, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. § 93,049.
168 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 through 3 (1969).
169 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
170 The WLiAMs Act set a 10% exempt limitation amendment. PuB. LAW No. 91-
567, Act of Dec. 21, 1970, however, lowered the floor to 5%. The reason for the amend-
ment was that insurgents stopped short of purchasing 10% to avoid disclosure. 5% own-
ership was thought substantial enough to require disclosure. Statement of SEC Chair-
man H. Budge in Hearing Held Before the Subcommnittee of Securities of the Senate
Commrdttee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 10 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as March Hearings].
1-1§ 13(d) (5) (B), 15 U.S.C. S 78m(d) (5) (B) (Supp. IV 1969).
172 § 13(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1969).
178 15 U.S.C. 9 78c(a)(9) (1964).
17415 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
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any plan or proposal to liquidate the target corporation, to sell its assets,
to merge it with any other corporation, or to make any other major
change in its business or corporate structure. The insurgent has to re-
veal, among other exposing disclosures, the source and amount of funds
for the purchase, and arrangements for proxies he has with shareholders.
Beginning with the original disclosure, 17 the insurgent must file
promptly with the SEC and send to the target and the Exchange amend-
ments disclosing any material changes in the facts set forth in the original
Schedule 13D statement. Thus, the insurgent is required to inform the
incumbents about any new acquisition of shares, plans, and arrange-
ments. The incumbents may utilize this valuable information to pressure
lenders and shareholders, to construct antitrust obstacles, and to effect
other defensive measures, limited only by their imagination.'"
One court has already decided that Sections 13 (d) through 16(d) are
a basis for private rights. 7 7 In that case, a shareholder's action against
an insurgent who failed to file either a 13 (d) or 16(a) report was sus-
tained on the theory that, had plaintiff known about the existence of a
10% shareholder, he would not have paid as high a price as he paid for
shares in the company. The Seventh Circuit has recently assumed' 78
that Section 13 (d) implies private rights, and that a target has standing
to wage a Section 13 (d) action. The court held that a Schedule 13D
filing is required when holders of more than 10% (now 5%) agree to
act in concert regarding a position against management by acquiring
shares. A showing of agreement to act in concert plus a subsequent pur-
chase by a member of the group creates a rebuttable presumption that
the group has agreed to further its aims by purchasing shares. On this
reasoning, the court upheld a wide preliminary injunction disfranchising
the insurgent group. 79 The shareholders were prevented from using
their original as well as their new shares to convene a general meeting
to have the board enlarged so that the president could be impeached.
175 The disclosure must be made within ten days of the purchase. A S 16(a) report
need not be filed until the tenth day of the following month.
176For a zealous criticism of § 13(d), see the testimony of J. Eskin in March Hear-
ings, supra note 170, at 126-39.
'"7 Grow Chemical Corp. v. Uran, CCH Fa. SFc. L. RarR. T 92,688 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
178Bath Indus. Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'g 305 F. Supp. 526 (ED.
Wis. 1969).
179 For an article praising the terms of the district court's order, see Dunn, The Wil-
liamis Amendments: An Evaluation of the Early Returns, 23 VAND. L. REv. 700, 724-27
(1970).
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The injunction would remain in force until it was determined that the
insurgents had complied with Section 13 (d). In short, the court thought
that decreeing compliance would not restore the status quo. Share-
holders might have sold shares to insurgents or given them proxies before
incumbents had a fair chance to present their case to shareholders,
basing their decisions, inter alia, on statutory disclosures by insurgents.
The Bath court took great pains to demonstrate that its interpretation
of Section 13 (d) is buttressed by the legislative history'80 of the Wil-
liams Act, and protects shareholders, not incumbents. However, it is
difficult to comprehend how Section 13 (d) can be read in the manner
of the Seventh Circuit. The section requires disclosures from "any per-
son who, after acquiring... equity security is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of such class" (emphasis
added), and verbal "acrobatics" cannot delete the words "after acquir-
ing" from the section. Furthermore, the exception for purchases of not
more than two percent during a year becomes meaningless under Bath
if a group is the purchaser. The court was also unable to answer in-
surgents' contention that imposing disclosure duties on an agreement to
upset incumbents, which contemplates share purchases, virtually nulli-
fies the effect of Rule 14a-2(a) of the proxy rules. Rule 14a-2(a)
exempts from the proxy regulation solicitation of less than ten persons.
Insurgents forcefully argued that the exemption was designed to afford
insurgents a degree of flexibility in making their preliminary sounding
of strength, and to mitigate the inherent advantages that incumbents have
in battles for control. The court was unable to explain why contempla-
tion of purchases (evident by later purchases), usually an integral part
180 "[Tlhe group would be required to file the information called for in section
13(d) (1) within 10 days after they agree to act together, whether or not any member
of the group had acquired any securities at that time." H. R. RE'. No. 1711, 90th Cong,
2d Sess. 8-9, 1968 U.S. CODF CONG. & ADM. NEws 2811, 2818.
The court purported to rely not on this one passage but on "the overriding purpose
of Congress in enacting [the Williams Act] to protect the individual investor when
substantial shareholders or management undertake to acquire shares in a corporation
for the purpose of solidifying their own position in a contest over how or by whom
the corporation should be managed." Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir.
1970). Actually, the Bath proposition will assist incumbents only when insurgents pur-
chase less than 2%. If insurgents purchase 2% or more, then under Sec. 13 (d) (3) they
must comply anyway. Under Sec. 13(d) (3), incumbents have only to show concert
plus 2% purchase, not concert to acquire. Concert to hold suffices. Under the Bath
test too, the duty starts only with the purchase; the insurgent has to file the 13D Sched-
ule within ten days from purchase. Thus, Bath distorts the statutory language in those
cases, probably few, where an insurgent group purchases less than 2%.
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of a control battle, destroys the right to an undisclosed preparation
for the contest. It is decisions such as Bath that call to mind Professor
Manne's evaluation of the Williams Act as pro-incumbent legislation.""'
The proxy rules contain an anti-fraud provision, Rule 14a-9,181 which
prohibits material misstatements or half-truths in proxy solicitation.
Furthermore, it is now settled that Rule lob-5 applies to proxy solicita-
tion for securities transactions in any company, even those not registered
under Section 12 (g) of the 1934 Act.8 3  The requisite showing under
Rule 10b-5 of a nexus with interstate commerce or the mails does not
present serious difficulties. The required disclosures under the proxy
rules serve as an important restraint on control-motivated transactions
of directors that require stockholder approval. However, if manage-
ment is ready to disclose that certain measures, such as staggering the
board or raising the majority vote for merger, are designed to eliminate
take over bids, its control over the proxy machinery may enable it to
carry the vote.' 4
While the SEC scrutinizes proxy materials of all factions, there is
no similar governmental clearance in England. Only proxy material of
the management of quoted companies must be cleared with the Ex-
changes.8 5 The SEC proxy rules require a proxy to be two-way for
each matter referred to therein, unless it relates only to election to
office.'8 6 If a matter relates to election to office and other matters, it
must provide means for the shareholder to withhold authority to vote
for the election of directors.8 7 However, if the proxy form conspic-
uously so states, the proxy can be voted for election of the designees if
the shareholders have not withheld authority.8 8 As a general rule, dis-
creationary authority to the proxy is prohibited.8 9 The important ex-
ception to this rule concerns matters whose presentation at the meeting
is unknown to the solicitors a reasonable time prior to the solicitation.
181 Manne, Cash Tender Offer for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 Duyx
LJ. 231; Salute to Raiders, Barron's, October 23, 1967. See also Stern, Triggering Scbed-
ule 13D, 3 Rev. SEc. REG. 851 (1970).
18217 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1971).
183 S.E.C. v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
184 See Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Chemetron Corp., 299 F. Supp. 367 (D. Del. 1969).
185 STOCK ExcHANGE RULES, Sch. VIII, Part A, 4(a).
18G Rule 14a-4(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(1) (1971).
187 Rule 14a-4(b) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2) (1971).
188 Id.
ISO Rule 14a-4(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c) (1971).
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In such instances, the proxy material must specifically secure the right
of discretionary vote. 9'
D. Expenses of Proxy Battles
Easier access to the proxy machinery is not the sole advantage
management possesses in a proxy battle.'9 ' If management can finance
the expenses 192 of a proxy fight from the corporate treasury, its success
is virtually assured. In response to the contention that its use of the
corporate treasury is a misapplication of funds, management can raise
two defenses. The first is that it is in the corporate interest to inform
shareholders of the points in issue between the opposition and manage-
ment. Management can support this contention by asserting that the
insurgent's policy is injurious to the corporation. The second, an argu-
ment relied upon by incumbents to justify their use of corporate funds,
is that on most occasions the insurgents are themselves corporations,
whose managements draw upon their own corporate treasuries to finance
190 Rule 14a-4(c) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(1) (1971).
'91 For an admirable discussion of the inherent advantage of the incumbents' stock-
holders' inertia, see A. BERLE & G. MEANs, Tni MODERN CORPORATIoN AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 86, 88, 139 (1932); Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REv.
1305, 1315-17 (1934); Friedman, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUM. L.
REv. 951 (1951). See also In re Dorman, Long & Co., [1934] Ch. 635, 655-56.
192 A proxy battle is a very expensive, rather prohibitive proposition. See the data
collected by ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 83, at 543-44, about the cost of some of the
more vigorous proxy battles of the last two decades. See also Machtinger, Proxy Fight
Expenditures of Insurgent Shareholders, 19 CASE W. RFs. L. REv. 212, 213 (1968). The
figure usually cited to underscore this point is the $2,159,000 cost of the two factions in
the New York Central Railroad proxy fight of 1954. The insurgents won that battle
and had the corporation defray their expenses. Gower put it aptly: "it meant that it
cost the New York Central's shareholders about two million dollars to substitute the
management of Mr. Young for the management of Mr. White. I do not suggest that
Mr. Young was not worth it, but the shareholders would presumably have been happier
still if he had not cost them quite so much." GOWER, COMPANY DIRECTORS AND TAKE-
OVER BIDs, 2 THE LAW IN ACTIoN 119, 128-29 (1957).
Machtinger, id., at 213, gathered from the SEC Annual Reports that, in the years
1956-66, 26,152 proxy solicitation statements were filed with the SEC, but only 272
contests for the election of directors occurred, of which 168 were for the control of the
board. The percentage of proxy contests to management's proxy statements declined
from 1.79% in 1958 to 0.80% in 1967. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory; Shareholder,
Managers, and Corporate Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. Rv. 248, at 269, n.76 (1969). The
resort by insurgents to takeover bids instead of proxy battles accounts for this decrease
in proxy contests. Of 23 proxy battles during 1956-60, only 9 were fully successful.
D. AUSTIN, PROXY CONESS AND COPORATE REFoRm 53-54 (1965).
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proxy expenses.'93 Consequently, if prohibited from access to the cor-
porate treasury, the incumbent management would face a distinct dis-
advantage.'t
The first defense has been a primary issue in cases in both England
and the United States. The second has not been squarely confronted
in the reported cases and is more in the nature of an undercurrent, yet
it cannot be easily disregarded. With their tendency to treat insurgents
as underdog shareholders, some writers overlook the fact that, to the
extent that management controls a corporation, the insurgent corpora-
tion represents the interests of its own incumbents. It is assumed that
the insurgent has a business purpose in attempting to gain control, 195 thus
making it very difficult to bring an action for waste against the in-
surgent's management. In this light, a court's readiness to find a busi-
ness purpose on the side of incumbent management is more under-
standable. However, the remedy for abuses by empire-seeking in-
surgent corporations should be to curtail these abuses rather than to
allow their adversaries to respond with counteracting abuses. Judicial
thinking in this area is examined below.
1. The English Approacb
In England, the question of tapping the corporate treasury arose as
early as 1886. In Studdert v. Grosvenor,'9" the directors of the Army
and Navy Co-operative Society were ordered in a derivative suit to
193 GowER, supra note 18, at 630, presents this point.
194 Froessel, J., alludes to this in Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309
N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (1955):
In the event of a proxy contest, if the directors may not freely answer the chal-
lenges of the outside groups and in good faith defend their actions with respect to
corporate policy for the information of the stockholders, they and the corporation
may be at the mercy of persons seeking to wrest control for their own purposes, so
long as such persons have ample funds to conduct a proxy contest.
Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1499-1502, submits that the prevention of a situation where
management is forced to capitulate is the only justification for allowing management
access to the corporate proxy machinery. Eisenberg, id., at 1500, suggests a matching
rule: management will be allowed to use the corporate machinery (including funds) to
the extent that that is necessary "to meet insurgents on equal terms."
195 An insurgents management can draw on the resources of its corporation to finance
the expenses of battle, but other corporations in the insurgent's "group" cannot con-
tribute funds to the battle. Such contribution would be ultra vires and a waste of assets
even if the target is a potential purchaser of the products of the contributors. See Kauf-
man v. Wolfson, 153 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
190 [1886J 33 Ch. D. 528.
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terminate their practice of sending stamped 9 7 proxies, with prepaid
reply envelopes, designating 9 8 directors as proxies.199 Justice Kay of
the Chancery Division observed that "such a course of proceeding
would practically give the directors power to determine in such manner
as they might think fit any question that might arise at such meeting." 200
The court held that only printing and sending expenses of "proper forms
of proxy papers" 201 were intra vires. Proper proxies were those which"would not tend in any way to influence the votes of the shareholders
receiving them." 202 Printing and posting expenses of improper proxies,
as well as stamping expenses of the proxies and return posting expenses 03
were ultra vires under any circumstances.20 4
Studdert was declared invalid by the Court of Appeal in Peel v.
London & North Western Ry.,' 0 5 a case involving a continuous fight
over corporate policy,200 in which the directors employed the same
procedure regarding proxies as in Studdert. In addition, they bom-
barded 2 7 shareholders with circulars and sent company officials to so-
197 Stamps on proxies pose little problem today. No stamp duty is now due on a
proxy to vote at a single meeting and adjournments thereof. Stamp duty (of 10 s.) is
due only on a general proxy to vote at more than one meeting. 1949 FINANcE Acr, 12,
13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 47, § 35 & Sch. 8. GowER, supra note 18, at 484, n.77.
198 See p. 445 supra.
199 The main issue in the case was the charging to the corporation of the costs of
libel actions brought by directors. However, the issue of the charging of proxy ex-
penses was not geared to a general meeting held to ratify the litigation costs. See the
editor's note accompanying the reported case, Studdert v. Grosvenor, [1886] 33 Ch. D.
528, at 531. The halfhearted attempt of Buckley, L. J., in the Peel case to explain Stud-
dert as relating only to proxies to approve the legal charges cannot be accepted.
20o Studdert v. Grosvenor, [1886] 33 Ch. D. 528, 539.
201 Id. at 540.
202 Id. It seems that it follows from the court's formulation that expenses due to at-
tempts to persuade the shareholders through circulars of the merits of the directors'
stance are also not chargeable to the corporation. Only a two-way proxy not accom-
panied by a proxy statement would qualify if the court's statement is taken literally.
203 The court reasoned that proxies are a matter of convenience for shareholders.
Therefore, "the directors have no more right to expend the funds of the company to
promote the convenience in this respect of a shareholder, who may be too indolent to
attend the meeting, than they would in providing him with posthorses or a special train
to enable him to attend." Id. at 539-40.
204The court intimated that, even in cases of blank proxies, the expenses of the stamp
on the proxy and the postage stamp for the return are an ultra vires misapplication of
funds. Id. at 539.
205 [19071 1 Ch. 5.
200 The points in issue were coordination with other railways, the size of wagons to
be used, and the extent of elaboration of the company's statistics and accounts.
207 Peel v. London N.W. Ry. [19071 1 Ch. 5, 6.
INTRACORPORATE BATTLES FOR CONTROL
licit personally certain shareholders. The court unanimously held that
all the expenses were intra vires and chargeable to the company, rea-
soning that directors have a duty to take whatever steps are reasonably
necessary to convene a general meeting and obtain the "best expression of
the voice of the corporators in general meeting." 108 Such expenses are,
however, subject to two restrictions. They must not be excessive and
must be "reasonably necessary" for obtaining the shareholders' views
on the disputed subjects.209 It followed from this principle that the
postage on proxies and return postage were chargeable to the corpora-
don. These two expenses are neutral in that they merely make the
voting rights more effective, and without more, do not promote the
interests of management over the opposition.
A more difficult question appeared in regard to the expenses calculated
to obtain the proxies for management. The court felt that directors
have the additional duty to inform shareholders of all facts relevant
to the business policy in issue which are known to them by virtue of
their corporate position. Such information was considered essential
for the shareholders to shape an intelligent decision. The court went
further and disposed of the case by holding that directors also have a
duty and a right to advise shareholders of their opinion, i.e., of the best
course for the corporation to follow. The duty to advise legalizes ex-
penses calculated to influence or to solicit.210 In other words, incum-
bents may take not only the steps necessary to inform shareholders, but
also those necessary to effectively present management's case,2 ' such
208 Id. at 18.
20 Id. at 19.
210 In the oft-quoted words of Vaughan Williams, L. J.:
Is it to be said that the board of directors of a company, whether a railway com-
pany or other company, who have had to adopt a particular policy, when that
policy is impeached by others (be the number of those who impeach big or small)
have not the positive duty to inform the shareholders what have been the reasons
for the policy which has been theretofore adopted, and why they think that that
policy should be maintained in the future? I cannot myself understand any one
having a doubt as to the directors having that duty.... [I]t is their duty to give
information of the facts which they think justify the policy. It is their duty to
put forward to the company those reasons which they think justify the policy
which the company with their assistance as managers has adopted, and to say
to the company, if they think in good faith that it is the best advice, 'Do not
attent to those people who are circularizing you to set aside the policy of the
company up to this date, but on the contrary trust us and leave it to us.' Id. at 12.
211 The decision of Vaughan Williams, L. J., alludes also to the "raiders" contention
in support of the court's proposition:
The attack in this particular case happens to be. an attack by an association of
high-minded gentlemen who only have the interests of the company at heart;
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as circulars and personal solicitations. 212 The court's holding was form-
ulated by Lord Justice Buckley.
The point here decided is that directors bona fide acting in the interests
of the corporation, and not to serve their own interests, are entitled
and bound to inform and guide the corporators in matters affecting
the corporate interests and any expenses reasonably incurred in so doing
may be borne out of the funds of the company.213
The Peel decision is appealing inasmuch as it seeks to make the suf-
frage rights of shareholders meaningful. Indeed, there is no point in
going half way, charging part of the expenses of executing a proxy to
the corporation and part to the directors. Nevertheless, it does not
follow that all of management's expenses in a proxy fight should be
borne by the corporation. The farther one moves from the expenses
for facilitating the exercise 214 of the franchise, the more questionable
becomes the corporate interest in the expenses. To start from the outer
limits, it can hardly be said that the expenses for all the gimmicks that
usually accompany a political campaign 2'1 are a matter of corporate
interest. Such expenses do more than inform shareholders; they apply
hard pressure on them to support management. Therefore, the reasoning
of the court in Peel that the same rule should apply to expenses for
informing and persuading would seem fallacious.
With respect to expenses for informing, the question arises as to the
partiality and selectivity of the information that management might
but in the principle that one has to deal with here, one must contemplate the
possibility of an attack being made by persons who have not the interests of the
company so much at heart-attacks it may be, by others who have a deeper
interest in other and competing undertakings. Id. at 13.
212 None of the three Justices (Vaughan Williams, L.J., Fletcher Moulton, L. J, and
Buckley, L. J.) addresses himself specifically to the question of personal solicitations by
corporate officers. It appears that the court endorsed counsel for defendants' contention
that "[i]f it is lawful for directors, as one set of officials, to send out circulars conveying
information, it is also lawful for the minor officials of the company to convey informa-
tion and ask shareholders whether they will support the policy of the directors. The
company is entitled to the assistance of all its officers." Id. at 9. Query whether the com-
pany is entitled to outside assistance (proxy solicitors)?2 13 1d. at 21.
2 14 In this category are included expenses for drafting, printing, and sending the no-
tice of a meeting and an accompanying proxy; expenses for the convention and holding
of the meeting, for processing the adequacy of proxies, and for the ballot and processing
of the results.
215 In this category are included persuasion expenses: public relations, proxy solicitors,
personal campaigning and soliciting, and entertaining voters, for example.
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furnish. The safeguard against a one-sided presentation of the issues in
dispute lies in the common law rules21 prohibiting fraudulent or negli-
gent misrepresentations2 17 Furthermore, the adversary system can be
relied upon to bring out the omissions and falsehoods in the board's
statements.
If such is the case, the insurgents' circulars, 21- even circulars of un-
successful insurgents, are of corporate interest much the same as the
incumbents' circulars. Insofar as the insurgents advocate changes in
policy, the information that they possess is relevant to shareholders.
Moreover, defeated incumbents are not obliged to return the proxy
battle expenses. Why should the law regard insurgents differently?
Likewise, there is an ever-existing danger that an attempt to take over
simply for control per se will be described as a battle over policy. A
similar danger exists relative to management's motivation for a proxy
fight. In Peel, it was admitted that management had "policy" motives.
Moreover, the opposition tried only to pass certain resolutions and
change business policy, not to grasp control itself. The court did not
have to deal with the question of how to determine management's
motives.219 The better rule, it seems, would place the burden of proving
2 1 6 Only the common law rules apply. The Prevention of Frauds (Investments) Act
1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, § 13 does not apply because the solicitation is directed toward
obtaining proxies, not toward influencing a sale or purchase. The 1967 Misrepresentation
Act, 16 & 17 Eliz. 2, c. 7, does not apply because there is no contract between the solici-
tor and the shareholders. Appointing a proxy, although a consensual transaction, is not
a contract.
217 Courts do not hesitate to vitiate resolutions passed as a result of "tricky" circulars.
Bailie v. Oriental Tel. Co., [1915] 1 Ch. 503; Tiessen v. Henderson, [1899] 1 Ch. 861;
Kaye v. Croydon Tramways Co., [1898] 1 Ch. 358. See also GowER, supra note 18, at 482.
21S Note that reimbursing a successful insurgent will not put him on the same footing
with incumbents because the insurgent will still need a bridging loan, which might not
be available.
219 Buckley, L. J., went to great pains to go on record that a control-motivated ex-
pense is a misapplication of funds.
Those who are conversant with the affairs of joint stock companies are well
aware that cases often arise in which the board in power are anxious to maintain
themselves in power, to promote their own re-election or to drive the policy
not really in the interests of the corporation, but for some private purpose of
their own, down the throats of the corporators at a general meeting, and in
which they issue at the expense of the company circulars and proxy papers for
the purpose of attaining that object. When a case of that kind comes before the
Court, I sincerely trust that the decision of this Court in this case will not be
cited as any authority for justifying the action of the directors. Peel v. London
N.W. Ry., [1907] 1 Ch. 5, 21.
However, incumbents so well manage with the Peel rule that no control-motivated case
has come before the courts.
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the "policy" motivation on management, which is justified by manage-
ment's ultimate knowledge of its motives and by the simplicity in con-
verting a fight over personalities to a fight over policy. Moreover, the
change in personalities, even if inspired only by a desire to grasp con-
trol, almost always causes some change in business practices. The Peel
rule220 virtually enables management to charge the expenses of the proxy
battle to the company. Even shifting the burden of proof is no more
than a minimal safeguard, as insurgents usually advocate (in their elec-
tion platform) changes in business policy, whether the business record
of management is good or bad. Thus, they supply management with
evidence that the contest is one of policy rather than of personality
questions.
To revert to the recovery at least of a successful insurgent's expenses,
it is germane to note that frequently the insurgent is a corporation. The
meaning of a recovery rule would encumber the target corporation with
the expenses of both its ousted management and the insurgent, while the
latter remains intact. Should the shareholders of the insurgent bear the
expenses of the takeover only to the extent of the insurgent's holding in
the target? Section 140(1) of the 1948 Companies Act implies that
such is the rule if the insurgent passes a resolution at the target corpora-
tion's general meeting to such effect. Legal writers disagree221 whether
the rule of Section 140(1) is limited to instances where the mechanism
of the section is followed,' or whether it expresses an application of
a general rule. Against the generality of the rule, it has been argued that
reimbursement of the insurgent would be an ultra vires waste of assets.2 23
220 The most troubling aspect of Peel is that the expenses for personal solicitation of
certain shareholders by corporate officials during working hours were approved in
spite of the restrictions on reasonableness. See notes 209 & 213 supra. One would hope
that expenses for professional solicitors and entertainment of shareholders (the English
learned quickly from the American example, see Gowa supra note 192, at 126-27) are
not reasonably necessary for effective franchise rights and presentation of management's
views. The practice in England is that management charges these costs too (id, at 128).
Thus far no derivative suits have been brought.
221 GowER, supra note 192, at 229, suggests that § 140(1) implies a general rule. WEiN.-
BERG, TAKE-OvERs AND AMALGAMATIONS 289 n.79 (2d ed. 1967) vigorously objected.
2 22 See pp. 433-34 supra.
2 2 3 WEINBERG, supra note 221, citing Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [19623 Ch. 927, 954,
and cases cited therein. Weinberg raises § 54 of the Companies Act, which prohibits a
company to assist the purchase of its shares, as an additional reason for opposing
Gower's view in the context of takeover bids. § 54 is irrelevant in proxy battles since
the corporate funds are not used "for the purpose of or in connection with a purchase"
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It is submitted here that, in this respect, reimbursement of incumbents
and insurgents should stand exactly on the same footing. The ex-
pense is intra vires insofar as it represents the cost of informing share-
holders of the merits and the demerits of conflicting corporate business
policies. It seems, however, that the Privy Council's decision in Camp-
bell v. Australian Mutual Provident Society22 weakens the insurgents'
chances of recovering from the company.
In Campbell, the incumbents, seeking to amend the by-laws to expand
the society's business, solicited proxies for the amendment through cir-
culars and personal solicitation by corporate officers. They also adver-
tised their circulars. The proxies were one-way proxies that designated
the directors as proxies. The insurgent group demanded that the di-
rectors also circulate at the society's expense a circular on their behalf
with a two-way proxy, and adjourn the called meeting to "enable mem-
bers to have as full notice of the reasons against the extension policy as
members had of directors' reasons in favour of the same." 225 The
board refused the demand, and the insurgents brought an action seek-
ing to establish that the by-laws were not properly amended, inter alia,
because the incumbents had charged their expenses to the society and
had refused to circulate the insurgents' material. The action also sought
to recover from the incumbents their proxy battle expenses. The Privy
Council held that management had acted properly, noting that "it was
right for the directors to give their advice and put things in train to
enable the members to act upon that advice," 220 and that it was proper
to expend whatever funds they saw fit for this purpose. On the other
hand, they held that there was "no obligation either legal or moral upon
the directors" 217 to circulate the material of the insurgents.
Several points emerge from the opinion. First, the court explicitly
upheld the utilization of corporate officers for personal solicitation.
Second, the holding that the directors do not have a duty to circulate
insurgent's material might, on the rationale of the Peel case, lead one to
conclude that the reimbursement of insurgents is ultra vires and not
of shares. If, however, the proxy battle is only a prelude to a merger, § 54 might well
become xelevant.
224 [1908J 99 L.T. 3.
225 Id. at 6.
220 Id. at 7.
I2' ld. at 6.
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capable of ratification by a general meeting.22 8 The third point, relating
to the right of minority shareholders to bring a suit alleging misapplica-
tion of corporate funds to finance a proxy battle, necessitates a brief
review of the previous cases.
In Studdert, the court allowed the minority action to be brought,
accepting the allegation that the utilization of corporate funds to finance
management's campaign is an ultra vires waste of assets. 22 The expense
was regarded as not capable of ratification and as challengeable under
an exception to the rule of Foss v. Harbottle.23 In Peel, Lord Justice
Buckley intimated that it did not appear that the expense could be re-
garded as ultra vires in the proper sense. He thought that the corporators
were the best judges of what expenses were "reasonably necessary" to
have effective representation of shareholders, and that the expense was
capable of ratification. In other words, even if the court concluded
that the directors did not have a right to draw upon the corporate
coffers, a minority action could not prevail because the act was capable
of ratification. The next step in this direction was taken in Campbell.
The court assumed that misapplication of the assets does not amount to
an ultra vires act, and that, because there was no allegation of fraud or
bad faith, "this would be sufficient of itself to dispose of the whole
appeal." 232 This statement seems unfortunate and evidences the con-
fusion in English law regarding minority suits. Expropriation of cor-
porate assets is "fraud on the minority," even without bad faith.3 3 In
light of the decisions holding that use of corporate assets for manage-
ment's campaign is an application for corporate purposes, the holdings
on insurgent's right to bring an action are thus only of academic value.23
228 As Williams, L. J., stated in Peel, "[Tihe question is whether they have the duty
-a duty which might reasonably involve the issue of these circulars-for unless they
have this duty, in my judgment they have no right whatever to issue them. [TIhey
cannot as a board have a right to do anything which is not within the scope of the
execution of the duties imposed upon them." Peel v. London N.W. Ry., [1907] 1 Ch. 5,
12.
22D Studdert v. Grosvenor, [1886] 33 Ch. D. 528, 534-35.
230 [18431 2 Hare 461.
233 Peel v. London N.W. Ry., [19071 1 Ch. 5, 19-20.
232 [1908] 99 L.T. 3, 6.
233 GowE, supra note 18, at 588.
234 If the holdings were that such use is not for a corporate purpose, the issue of a
minority's standing would become significant. The Peel and Campbell cases would not
recognize such standing. Interestingly enough, use of corporate powers and assets to
fend off takeover bids was held to be not for a corporate purpose, but ratifiable. Yet a
minority plaintiff is allowed standing. The action, however, is stayed and the matter
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2. The American Approach
a. Corporate Underwriting of Incumbents
The difficult question of the defrayment of proxy battle expenses has
been the subject of litigation in the United States more often than in
England, and American literature on the subject is abundant.235 Natural-
ly, a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this article, and such
will not be attempted here. The rule enunciated by case law has been
that proper and reasonable management expenses in a bona fide battle
over corporate policy are chargeable to the corporation. Policy issues,
defined broadly, include, for example, conflict over a service contract
of a director," and charges of self-dealings or self-serving transactions.
Expenses for a battle over control per se are not chargeable to the cor-
poration. The most difficult questions are (a) what expenses are proper
and reasonable, and (b) on whom does the burden of proof as regards
propriety and reasonableness lie.
It is agreed that the expenses of providing shareholders with wide-
spread information relevant to the policy dispute are made for a cor-
porate purpose. However, it remains somewhat unsettled whether ex-
penses for solicitation are proper. Expenses for advising shareholders of
management's position in the dispute are considered an integral part of
the expenses of furnishing pertinent information for a reasoned decision.
The major issue revolves around the propriety of expenses for solicita-
tion that goes beyond advising. They include the funds expended for
advertisements in the media, personal canvassing, employment of pro-
fessional solicitors and of public relations firms, entertainment of share-
holders, and the vast sums expended in "a strenuous campaign to per-
suade and cajole in a hard-fought contest for control." 237
is referred to the general meeting. Bamford v. Bamford [1970] Ch. 212; Hogg v. Cramp-
horn, Ltd. [1967] Ch. 254.23 5 See ARANOW & Em~aola, supra note 83, chs. 20-22; M. FEuER, PERSONAL LIABILITES
oF CoRpoaxrE OFIcms ANi DREaCroRs 115-21 (1961); L. Loss, SacuTmrms REGULATIONS
857-66 (1961); Emerson & Latchman, Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholders De-
mocracy, 4 GAsE W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1952); Emerson & Latchman, Proxy Contests:
A Study in Shareholder Sovereignty, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 393 (1953); Friedman, Expenses
of Proxy Contests, 51 CoLiJm. L. REv. 951 (1951); Machtinger, Proxy Fight Expenditures
of Insurgent Shareholders, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 212 (1968). See also, Note, 36
CORNELL L. Q. 558 (1951); Note, 43 VA. L. REv. 391 (1957) and the notes listed in note
242 infra. This list does not purport to be exhaustive.23G Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N. Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291
(1955).
237 d., at 172, 128 N.E.2d at 295.
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Most of the cases have arisen in New York and Delaware. At about
the same time when the Peel case arose in England, the New York Court
of Appeals passed on similar issues in Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Con-
solidated Railroad Lighting & Refrigerating Co.2 38 The New York
court, espousing a narrower rule than the English, held that expenses
for advertising the convention 239 of a special meeting were intra vires.240
However, the court decided that further expenses incurred in urging
shareholders to execute proxies already in their possession and in counter-
answering circulars of contestants were ultra vires as to the directors, but
conceded "that the directors who caused this publication acted in good
faith and felt that they were serving the best interests of the stockhold-
ers." 241
The dispute in Lawyers' Advertising, arising between the president
and the board over alleged misapplication of assets by the president,
probably would be classified in present day terminology as a policy dis-
242pute. Nevertheless, the court held that it would be dangerous to allow
incumbents to charge to the corporation expenses for solicitation, by
publishing advertisements, or "by analogy, of dispatching special mes-
sengers." 243 The notices were "proceeding by one faction in its contest
with another for the control of the corporation," 244 and did not serve
any corporate purpose. In short, Lawyers' Advertising reached a result
different from Peel as to expenses for soliciting, as distinguished from
informing.
In 1955, when the question was reconsidered in New York in the
cornestone case of Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.,245
238 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907).
239 The propriety of preparing and mailing proxy material is wel established. Rounds
v. Stephenson, 187 S.W. 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Appeal Printing Co. v. Segal Lock
& Hardware Co., 128 N.Y.L.J. 1563 (N.Y. City Ct. 1953).
240 "Proper and honest corporate management was subserved by widespread notice to
stockholders on questions affecting the welfare of the corporation, and there is no
impropriety in charging the latter with any expenses within reasonable limits which
were incurred in giving sufficient notice of a special meeting at which the stockholders
would be called upon to decide these questions." Lawyers Advertising Co. v. Con-
solidated Ry. Lighting & Refrigerating Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N. 199, 200 (1907).
241 Id. at -- , 80 N.E. at 201.
242 See note 236 supra and accompanying text.
243Lawyers Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. Lighting & Refrigerating Co., 187
N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199, 200 (1907).
244 d. at -- , 80 N.E. at 200-01.
245 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). Noted inter alia, in 43 CALIF. L. RaV. 893
(1955); 56 COLuM. L. REv. 633 (1956); 41 CoRNELL L.Q. 714 (1956); 44 GEo. L.J. 303
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the court split 3:1:3. Judge Froessel and his two supporters ruled that in
a contest over policy, corporate directors have the right to make reason-
able and proper expenditures from the corporate treasury for the "solici-
tation of proxies and in defense of their corporate policies and are not
obliged to sit idly by." 24  This includes expenses of "persuading the
stockholders of the correctness of their position and soliciting their sup-
port for policies which the directors believe, in all good faith, are in the
best interests of the corporation." 247 This parallels the rule laid down in
Peel. As in England, the application of the rule favors incumbents even
more than the rule itself.
The lower court in Rosenfeld had found as fact that "the management
group incurred a substantial amount of needless expense which was
charged to the corporation." Nevertheless, the incumbents prevailed be-
cause the plaintiff did not segregate the specific ultra vires expenditures.
Judge Froessel's decision placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff 28
to establish the motivation of management and the impropriety and clas-
sification of expenses. Judge Desmond, in his concurring opinion, noted
that only the expenses of serving formal notices and of routines proxy
solicitation may be assessed to the corporation. Expenses for procuring
proxies from informed shareholders are "intrinsically unlawful." 24 9
However, he shared the majority's view that the "burden was on plain-
tiff to go forward to some extent with such particularization and
proof," 250 and that in failing to do so, plaintiff failed to establish a prima
facie case.
Judge Van Voorhis, writing a strong dissent in which two of his
brethren joined, vigorously rejected the distinction between policy bat-
tles and battles for control per se, pointing out how easily every battle
can be depicted as one involving corporate policy. He thought that in
any proxy battle "only such [expenses] as [are] reasonably related to
informing the stockholders fully and fairly concerning the corporate
(1956); 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 825 (1956); 31 NoTRE DAMa LAW. 308 (1956); 23 U. Cm. L.
REv. 682 (1956); 24 U. Cn. L. REv. 606 (1955); 7 W. RES. L. REv. 198 (1956).
248 Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291, 293
(1955).
247 Id.
248 The action was a derivative one. Plaintiff's standing to trigger a corporate suit for
waste of assets was not doubted.
249 Id. at -, 128 N.E.2d at 295 (1955). Desmond, J, was of the opinion that a rati-
fication by a general meeting is therefore of no avail.
250 Id. at -, 128 N.E.2d at 294.
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affairs should be allowed," 251 and that expenditures beyond that should
be ultra vires. Since the lower court found that there were some needless
expenses, the plaintiff made a prima facie case. As in other instances
where it is established that directors have a personal interest in a corpo-
rate expenditure that they have authorized, the burden is on them to go
forward with the evidence of the propriety and reasonableness of spe-
cific items of expenditure.
From this analysis, clearly the majority of the court (Judge Desmond
and the Van Voorhis group) was of the opinion that expenses of a solici-
tation campaign cannot be assessed to the corporation. 22 The incumbent
directors prevailed only because of the majority's refusal to shift the
burden of going forward with the evidence. As earlier noted, it is not
the rule regarding intra vires expenses, but rather its application that
tips the scale in favor of management.
The propriety of the expenses for exerting pressure on shareholders
by hiring professional solicitors has been assumed in one New York
case,a23 but has been rejected by at least one jurisdiction 254 and at one
time by the SEC.255 Interestingly enough, the New York court sup-
ported its conclusion by arguing that the proxy rules contemplate the
propriety of the employment of professional proxy solicitors. The proxy
rules merely require that soliciting factions disclose their employment
of proxy solicitors, their remuneration, and the financers. 2 The duty
to disclose an act does not legalize that act.2 57
In a leading Delaware case, Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen
Co.,258 battle was waged between the views of Peel259 and Lawyers' Ad-
vertising,260 and Peel prevailed. In the process, however, the facts and
251 Id. at -, 128 N.E.2d at 297.
252 Later cases, however, refer to Froessel, J.'s, decision as the "rule" of the Rosenfeld
case. Begleiter v. Moreland, 33 Misc. 2d 119, 225 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Selama-
Dindings Plantations, Inc. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963), aff'd 337 F.2d
949 (6th Cir. 1964).
253 In re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
254 Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Walker, 92 Pirr. L.J. 464 (C.P. Allegheny County 1944).
255 Standard Gas & Electric Co., SEC HOLDING Co. ACT RELEASE No. 7020 at 5, Dec. 2,
1946.
256 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Sch. 14A, Item 3 (1971).
257 Several writers have made this point. For the references, see ARANow & EiNHoRN,
supra note 83, at 559, n.55.
258 171 A. 226 (Del. 1934).
259 Somehow Peel was "americanized" into Pell in the court's decision.
260 See note 235 supra.
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principles of the two cases were stated inaccurately. The court finally
concluded that in contests over policy as distinguished from contests
over management personnel, incumbents may defray to the corporation
expenses "reasonably necessary to inform the stockholders of the con-
siderations which the directors deem sufficient to support the wisdom
of the policy advocated by them and under attack, and in the same com-
munications which the directors address to the stockholders in support
of their policy they may solicit proxies in its favour." 261 The decision
does not detail the proxy expenses but it seems that all of them were to
finance circulars. It should be noted that the Delaware court erroneously
distinguished Lawyers' Advertising by maintaining that it dealt with a
pure contest over personnel.262 Likewise, the Peel case was incorrecdy
described 263 as a contest over policy arising in a directors' election. The
court held that management can withdraw money from the corporate
coffers, not only when a policy question arises in the abstract, but also
when policy questions arise in a contested election. Observing that ques-
tions of policy and personnel are "inextricably blended," 2 4 the court
found that a contested merger proposition and a suggested "spinning-
off" of stock in a subsidiary were the basis of the conflict between the
two slates. The court, finding as a matter of fact that policy issues were
involved, did not dwell on the burden of proof.265
As in other states, the outer boundaries of expenses chargeable to the
corporation are not clear in Delaware.266 Most of the limited Delaware
law on the subject has emerged from the continuous contest over the
control of M.G.M.2 r In Campbell v. Loew's ine.,2 68 a fight arose be-
tween two factions of management, pitting the president and a minority
of the board against the majority of the board. The president's slate
represented a minority only because several of its nominees had resigned
from the board. Although holding that the president's group had suffi-
261 Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226, 227 (Del. 1934).
262See notes 242 and 235 supra and accompanying text.
263 Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226, 228-29 (Del. 1934).
2041d. at 229.
2tu Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
2061h 1944, a federal court on a motion for a preliminary injunction observed that
no Delaware case thus far had sanctioned the hiring of professional proxy solicitors by
management at corporate expense. Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp.
649, 650, n.1 (D. Del. 1944).
267For an account, see GARY, supra note 83, at 220-21. Finally, one insurgent (Kirk
Kirkorian) succeeded in 1969 in taking over M.G.M. via the tender offer route.
268 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957).
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cient "corporate status" to use corporate funds to present its position to
stockholders, the court enjoined that group from using corporate facil-
ities and employees in connection with its solicitation. The court based
its injunction on the rationale that involving corporate employees in the
dispute would carry the intra-corporate strife even deeper within the
corporation. Because the chancellor noted that his decision was based
on the corporate status of the two quarreling factions, the decision is
not authority for the impropriety of management's using employees in
its campaign against outsiders.
Recently, a federal court adopted a very liberal rule for Delaware in
a later stage of the contest for control of M.G.M. In Levin v. M.G.M.,
Inc.,269 the court refused Levin's motion to enjoin the incumbent
O'Brien's slate from using corporate funds to pay for the services of
specially retained attorneys, two proxy soliciting firms, and a public
relations firm, and from using services of employees in the solicitation
campaign. To a large degree, the court based its decision on the regular-
ity of M.G.M. management's use of all the challenged methods. Similar-
ly, another Delaware case has implicitly sanctioned the employment of
professional proxy solicitors. In Steinberg v. Adams, where "the contest
was conducted by printed appeals for proxies addressed to the stock-
holders, and employment of proxy solicitors and other devices not un-
usual in such campaigns," 2 70 the court held that all the expenses were
proper if management fought for its policy.
b. Corporate Reimbursement of Insurgents
On the question of reimbursing successful insurgents, a Delaware
court 271 has held that defrayment of reasonable expenditures of the in-
surgent in a policy dispute, including reasonable expenses for proxy
solicitors, if ratified by a general meeting, is a company expenditure ex-
pended for a corporate purpose. The court reasoned that in a proxy
campaign over policy issues, the insurgent performs the same function
as the incumbents, i.e., to supply relevant information to shareholders.
The court analogized to a derivative suit in which the successful deriva-
tive plaintiff recovers his costs (including attorney's fees) on the theory
269 264 F. Supp. 797 (SD.N.Y. 1967).
270 Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); noted in 36 CoRNeL
L.Q. 558 (1951) and 61 YALE L.J. 229 (1952).
27190 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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that he has benefitted the company.2 72 The court saw "no reason why
the stockholders should not be free to reimburse those whose expendi-
tures succeeded in ridding a corporation of a policy frowned upon by
the majority of stockholders." 273
The New York Rosenfeld case declared the New York rule27 4 no
more stringent than the rule in Delaware. Judge Froessel disposed of the
point: "Where a majority of the stockholders chose . . . to reimburse
the successful contestants for achieving the very end sought and voted
by them as owners of the corporation, we see no reason to deny the ef-
fect of their ratification nor to hold the corporate body powerless to
determine how its own moneys shall be spent." 27 , Judge Van Voorhis,
dissenting, opined that the insurgents' expenses in their entirety could
not be charged to the corporation. He thought that because the insur-
gents were not charged with the responsibility for operating the com-
pany, their expenses did not benefit the company. He emphasized that
the ultimate success does not assure benefits to the company, and that
agitation of corporate issues can result in corporate advantage even if
an insurgent loses. In short, he thought that the expenses of insurgents
are ultra vires and hence not capable of being ratified by a majority of
shareholders. As in the role for corporate gifts, 76 only a unanimous gen-
eral meeting could sanction them.
Both the Delaware and New York rules assure successful contestants
of corporate underwriting. The ratification requirement is a mere for-
mality, because the new incumbents who have just won a proxy fight
will have no problem in obtaining ratification. Nevertheless, one should
ask what is the basis for the requirement of ratification. Prima facie,
272 This analogy was rejected by Van Voorhis, J, in the New York Rosenfeld case
as "entirely without foundation." Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309
N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (1955).
273 Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
274In Cullom v. Simmonds, 285 App. Div. 1051, 1051-52, 139 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (2d
Dept. 1955), the court held sufficient a complaint maintaining that reimbursement to
successful contestants was illegal despite ratification because the insurgents' campaign
was not directed toward sharpening corporate policy but toward grasping control and
defaming some of the incumbents.
275 Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 129 N.E.2d 291,
293 (1955). Desmond, J., apparently agreed that ratification invalidates corporate de-
frayment of insurgents' expenses that meet the "test of propriety." It was improper ex-
penses-he did not distinguish between incumbents' and insurgents'-that he thought
could not be ratified. Id. at -, 128 N.E.2d at 295.
276 Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
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either the expense is for a corporate purpose and a board decision to re-
imburse will suffice, or it is for an ultra vires purpose and no ratification
can validate it. One writer has suggested that ratification is needed be-
cause of the self-interest of the new board in reimbursing their frac-
tion,2 77 but (with all due respect), that proposition seems untenable. The
old management has the same self-interest, and its expenses are charged
to the corporation without need for shareholders' approval. This asym-
metry of the law seems inexplicable.17 8
The rule for allowing recovery to the successful opposition, as fash-
ioned by the courts, assures reimbursement in a contested election and
denies it in a contested corporate transaction that needs shareholders'
approval.279 This result exposes the weakness of the rule. When the
dispute concerns policy alone, the insurgents must finance their cam-
paign even if they win. When the fight concerns control, with only lip
service paid to policy issues, successful insurgents have a right to bill the
captured corporation.
Legal commentators have emphasized that the law should reimburse
a meritoriously defeated opposition as well as a successful one, reasoning
that in a policy dispute defeated oppositions contribute to the intelligent
decision of shareholders and serve a corporate purpose. In short, they
employ Justice Van Voorhis' contention that success is not the criterion,
but reverse the argument to allow every meritorious opposition to de-
fray reasonable campaign expenses. The problem is how to formulate
a rule that will not open the floodgates and dilute corporate capital by
underwriting endless fights. Some writers have suggested a quantitative
277 M. FEuER, PERSONAL LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 118 (1961).
Feuer also submits that "a conclusive presumption of corporate benefit arises from the
adoption of such [advocated by insurgents] policies by the majority of stockholders."
This seems a poor contention. Why is a majority decision to present a gift not a con-
clusive presumption of the benefit to the company of the gift?
278 Compare the English decisions of Hogg v. Cramphorn, [1967] Ch. 254, and Barn-
ford v. Bamford, [1970] Ch. 212, where the courts held that issue of shares to thwart
a takeover bid is valid if ratified by the general meeting. See also note 300 infra.
279 Grodetsky v. McCrory Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 322, 267 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
1966), aff'd 276 N.Y.S.2d 841, 27 A.D.2d 646 (1966). That is true because only if the
insurgents become incumbents can they pass the reimbursing resolution. The Grodetsky
court reasoned that it could only scrutinize the reasonableness of an award voted by
shareholders and could not decree one.
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minimum score at the ballot;-280 others have suggested advance scrutiny
by the court.28' Case law has thus far refused8 2 recovery to defeated
insurgents, and the suggestion 283 that the S.E.C. prescribe such a rule
under its rule-making power, delegated in Section 14(a) of the 1934
Act, has not been implemented.
c. Government Underwriting
Another aspect of the complex problem of financing proxy fights is
the extent to which the incidents of a fight should be borne by the gov-
ernment by allowing the adversaries to deduct expenses. Concerning
management's expenses, although it has always been assumed28 4 (and
has thus been the practice) that these expenses fall within Section 162 (a)
of the Internal Revenue Code285 as "ordinary and necessary" expenses in
carrying on the business, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has re-
cently denied the deduction of management's expenses for legal coun-
sel, proxy solicitors, and public relations experts. However, the federal
district court of Connecticut has found the IRS's position untenable
and has allowed the deduction.8 6 The IRS has since acquiesced, insert-
ing a proviso that expenses "made primarily for the benefit of the inter-
ests of individuals rather than in connection with questions of corporate
policy" will be disallowed as deductions.287 In short, tax law has followed
corporate law.
280E.g., Friedman, supra note 235, at 963-64. For elaborate suggestions of criteria for
screening, see EMERSoN & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 142 (1954); Emerson
& Latcham, Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder Democracy, 4 W. RES. L. Rxv. 5
(1952); Note, 61 YALE L.J. 229 (1952).
281 FEu, supra note 277, at 121.
282Phillips v. United Corp., 5 SEC Jud. Dec. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), appeal dismissed,
171 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1948).
283Friedman, supra note 235, at 960.
284 Note, 42 T.x. L. REv. 558, 559 (1964).
2 855 NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a).
280 Locke Mfg. Companies v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1964). This
case makes interesting reading also in regard to the corporate aspects of financing a
proxy fight. The court relied heavily on Congress' aim to promote corporate franchise
in order to establish the regularity of the expenses of a full-scale prpxy campaign.
A recent case ruled that both ousted managements and successful insurgents' expenses
are deductible by the corporation. Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. No. 25
(1967).
287 Rev. Rul. 67-1, 1967 INr. REv. BuL. No. 10, at 7.
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Regarding the deductibility of the insurgents' expenses, one must
distinguish expenses of a corporate insurgent from those of an individual
insurgent. The former may be deducted because the proxy fight is waged
to promote a corporate and is thus an ordinary and necessary expense
of carrying on a business. The latter will be allowed a deduction under
Section 212 of the Internal Revenue Code only if he can show that the
expense was ordinary and necessary "for the production of income" or
"for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
for the production of income." 288 While the IRS first contended that
expenses of a proxy fight were not proximately connected with the in-
crease of dividends or the increase in value of the stock to qualify under
Section 212, federal courts in the fourth and fifth Circuits have rejected
the IRS's interpretation of Section 212.289 Thus, the principle has
emerged from the case law that a taxpayer who does battle with man-
agement to increase or preserve his income, and who does so with a
reasonable expectation of success in a struggle over policy rather than
in a "vendetta," 290 may deduct reasonable proxy expenses.2 1
The rule of deductibility of management's expenses decreases the
burden on the corporation, but does not decrease the advantage of the
incumbents. The "smaller" corporate cost still sets in motion the same
proxy campaign.292 On the other hand, deductibility is an important ad-
vantage to insurgents because it gives them a right to pass on a portion
of the expenses that they could have otherwise recovered only if they
had won an election contest.
2 8 8 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 212.
289 Graham v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1964); Surasky v. United States,
325 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1963). The IRS has partially acquiesced in the holding in Surasky
("except to the extent that the court in its opinion indicates that to be deductible
proxy fight expenses need not be proximately related to the production or collection
of income or to management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income") and fully in the holding in Graham. Rev. Rul. 64-236, 1964
Cum. Bull. 64, 65.
290 Dyer v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1965).
291 Machtinger, Proxy Fight Expenditures of Insurgent Shareholders, 19 CAsE W.
REs. L. Rav. 212, 229 (1968). For an earlier note on deductibility of proxy expenses, see
Note, Proxy Fight Expenses: Problems of Tax Deduction, 43 VA. L. Rav. 891 (1957).
292 Presumably the incumbents may deduct their proxy expenses under § 212 of the
Int. Rev. Code of 1954. Because their marginal tax rate may be higher than the corporate
rate, they may be passing on to the corporation a higher cost than they would have
had to incur themselves. Note that, in making a § 212 case, directors might have to
argue that they fought for their salaried positions, not for policy issues.
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d. Disfranchisement of Proxies Obtained by Illegal Use of
Corporate Funds
In most cases, incumbents have already 93 tapped the corporate coffers
to finance their campaign when the insurgents rush to court to seek an
injunction. The question then arises as to what is an adequate remedy
where the court finds that some or all of the expenses were improper.
One might well argue that equity will be done if, in addition to order-
ing recovery, the court will disfranchise the proxies obtained through
misapplication of corporate assets. The question, however, is not an
easy one. Incumbents may reply that they had a right to spend their
private fortunes on the campaign, and such is the result if recovery is
ordered. Why penalize them when they can be charged interest? It
seems, however, that merely ordering recovery is not a sufficient remedy.
Access to the corporate till virtually assures the incumbents' re-election,
and a rule that requires only the repayment of a loan forced on the cor-
poration has little if any deterrent effect. Further, the incumbents might
not have been able to borrow the funds from other sources, and they
might not now command sufficient personal funds to account to the
corporation. However, one court has intimated that in the ordinary case
disfranchisement is not warranted, and that recovery would make whole
the injury.294
3. Comparison
The English rule presumably sanctions the charging of incumbents'
expenses for persuasion to the company,295 while the American law, at
293 One court espoused a possibly dangerous proposition. Stating that an after the fact
derivative suit will recover misapplied funds, the court refused to enjoin preliminarily
the resort by management to the corporate tills. McGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.LJ. 461
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd mein. sub. nonz., Blum v. Segal, 277 App. 963, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 850
(1950). Noted in 64 HARv. L. REv. 668 (1951).
294 Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649, 651 (D. Del. 1944).
295 It is true that both Peel and Campbell involved abstract battles over policy and
not policy issues in a control battle. Presumably, however, the same rules apply in both
instances. Such was the holding of the Hall case in Delaware. See p. 471 supra. In Eng-
land, the requirements for quorum are usually much lighter than in the United States.
(The rule of a closed agenda compensates for a small quorum. In the United States, the
quorum is higher and the agenda much more open). Gower, supra note 139, at 1391;
Garrett, Attitudes on Corporate Democracy-A Critical Analysis, 51 Nw. U. L. Rsv.
310, 313 (1956). Thus the need to gather a quorum cannot be argued as a justification
for hiring professional solicitors. American writers accept such justifications. Friedman,
supra note 235, at 954. When, by virtue of a statutory provision or a provision in the
corporate constitution, shareholder action of a specified majority is required, the per-
suasion expenses may be justified in England as well as in the United States.
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least in New York, is unsettled on that point. To be sure, the English
cases do not involve professional proxy solicitors or public relations
men; however, the cases rely on the principle that expenditures for per-
suasion in a policy contest are part of making an effective case by man-
agement. Shifting the burden of proof has not been considered in Eng-
land, and the chances for fashioning such a rule are slim. Similarly,
England has no "fairness rule" 296 for conflicts of interest. Self-dealing
is voidable even if fair, unless the articles of association allow the trans-
action, or it is ratified by the shareholders. Hence, there are no prece-
dents from which to analogize that the burden shifts to the directors to
show that they were motivated by policy considerations, and that the
expenses were reasonable.29 7 Furthermore, the question of reimbursement
of successful or meritorious unsuccessful insurgents has not yet been
litigated in England. On one hand, the English rules of corporate pur-
pose and incidental benefit to the corporation are narrower than those
of the United States. Even a unanimous ratification of shareholders
cannot validate an ultra vires expenditure, let alone a majority vote.298
On the other hand, recent decisions29 have held that a director's act not
made for a corporate purpose, yet motivated by policy considerations,
can be ratified. Arguably, the principle applies mutatis mutandis to the
proxy expenses of insurgents. It can be maintained, however, that the
analogy is not warranted because the principle applies to only well-
motivated defective decisions of the board.300
In the United States, the government to a certain extent underwrites
the proxy campaign, whereas in England the question has not been liti-
gated. It seems, however, that the incumbents' expenses in England
296 See Insider Trading, supra note 62, at 288-90.
297 In the Rosenfeld case, it was decided that the burden of proof is shifted by such
an analogy. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d
291, 296 (1955). See Insider Trading, supra note 62, at 289.
298 Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [1961] 1 W.L.R. 493.
2 9 Hogg v. Cramphorn, [1967] Ch. 254, and Bamford v. Bamford, [1968] 3 W.L.R.
317, aff'd [1970] Ch. 212.
300 The board's decision to reimburse the insurgents cannot be said to be motivated
by a desire to promote the interests of the corporation. These interests have already
been served by the insurgents. To say that the board's resolution serves a corporate
purpose because it will encourage other shareholders to air their views seems farfetched.
The shareholders' decision is designed to make the insurgents' campaign an act for a
corporate purpose, not to make the board's decision such an act.
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could be deducted from the corporate income while an individual in-
surgent's expenses would not be deductible from his income. °1
CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis has noted those deficiencies in the corporate
systems of England and the United States that frustrate corporate de-
mocracy and the functioning of the market for corporate control. It is
submitted that legislators in these jurisdictions should devise rules that
will make meaningful the power to hire and fire. In the United States,
directors should be made removable by a simple majority without cause.
In the United States and in England, the statutes should invalidate cir-
cumventing devices, such as the weighting of voting power solely for
the purpose of blocking a removal resolution. In the United States,
minority shareholders should have the right to call a general meeting,
and the shareholders' register should be made open for inspection. The
shareholders' proposal provisions in the United States and England
should be revised to enable insurgents to make an adequate presentation
at corporate expense. Further, rules should be devised for a fair alloca-
tion of corporate funds for incumbents' and insurgents' proxy cam-
paigns. Finally, the regulation of proxy contests should be revised in
order to achieve a better balance between providing shareholders with
adequate information and not assisting managements to entrench them-
selves.
301The rules for deduction of business expenses are similar in the two countries.
Compare WTS: United Kingdom, 7/2.1, and WTS: United States, 7/2.1. Since England,
however, does not have a section comparable to § 212 of the Internal Revenue Code,
the insurgents expenses will be personal and not business.
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